We may remark that this recognition by Aristotle of a class of universal affirmative propositions in which predicate and subject reciprocate, contrived in order to force Induction into the syllogistic framework, is at variance with his general view both of reciprocating propositions and of Induction. He tells us (Analyt. Post. I. iii. p. 73, a. 18) that such reciprocating propositions are very rare, which would not be true if they are taken to represent every Induction; and he forbids us emphatically to annex the mark of universality to the predicate; which he has no right to do, if he calls upon us to reason on the predicate as distributed (Analyt. Prior. I. xxvii., p. 43, b. 17; De Interpret. p. 17, b. 14).] [Footnote 47: Ibid. II. xxii. p. 68, a. 2-15.] [Footnote 48: Ibid. a. 16-21. [Greek: plê\n au)tou= tou= A]. Waitz explains these words in his note (p. 531): yet I do not clearly make them out; and Alexander of Aphrodisias declared them to assert what was erroneous ([Greek: e)spha/lthai le/gei], Schol. p. 194, a. 40, Brandis).] [Footnote 49: Ibid. II. xxii. p. 68, a. 21-25.] Lastly, suppose two pairs of opposites, A and B, C and D; let A be more eligible than B, and D more eligible than C. Then, if A C is more eligible than B D, A will also be more eligible than D. For A is as much worthy of pursuit as B is worthy of avoidance, they being two opposites; the like also respecting C and D. If then A and D are equally worthy of pursuit, B and C are equally worthy of avoidance; for each is equal to each. Accordingly the two together, A C, will be equal to the two together, B D. But this would be contrary to the supposition; since we assumed A to be more eligible than B, and D to be more eligible than C. It will be seen that on this supposition A is more worthy of pursuit than D, and that C is less worthy of avoidance than B; the greater good and the lesser evil being more eligible than the lesser good and the greater evil. Now apply this to a particular case of a lover, so far forth as lover. Let A represent his possession of those qualities which inspire reciprocity of love towards him in the person beloved; B, the absence of those qualities; D, the attainment of actual sexual enjoyment; C, the non-attainment thereof. In this state of circumstances, it is evident that A is more eligible or worthy of preference than D. The being loved is a greater object of desire to the lover _qua_ lover than sexual gratification; it is the real end or purpose to which love aspires; and sexual gratification is either not at all the purpose, or at best only subordinate and accessory. The like is the case with our other appetites and pursuits.[50] [Footnote 50: Analyt. Prior. II. xxii. p. 68, a. 25-b. 17. Aristotle may be right in the conclusion which he here emphatically asserts; but I am surprised that he should consider it to be proved by the reasoning that precedes.