minor term) mean the individual animals--man, horse, mule, &c., coming under the class-term B, bile-less.[53] We are supposed to know, or to have ascertained, that A may be predicated of all C; (_i.e._ that all men, horses, mules, &c., are long-lived); we farther know that B is predicable of all C (_i.e._ that men, horses, mules, &c., belong to the class bile-less). Here, then, we have two premisses in the Third syllogistic figure, which in themselves would warrant us in drawing the particular affirmative conclusion, that A is predicable of _some_ B, but no more. Accordingly, Aristotle directs us to supplement these premisses[54] by the extraneous assumption or postulate, that C the minor comprises all the individual animals that are bile-less, or all those that correspond to the class-term B; in other words, the assumption, that B the middle does not denote any more individuals than those which are covered by C the minor--that B the middle does not stretch beyond or overpass C the minor.[55] Having the two premisses, and this postulate besides, we acquire the right to conclude that A is predicable of _all_ B. But we could not draw that conclusion from the premisses alone, or without the postulate which declares B and C to be co-extensive. The conclusion, then, becomes a particular exemplification of the general doctrine laid down in the last chapter, respecting the reciprocation of extremes and the consequences thereof. We thus see that this very peculiar Syllogism from Induction is (as indeed Aristotle himself remarks) the opposite or antithesis of a genuine Syllogism. It has no proper middle term; the conclusion in which it results is the first or major proposition, the characteristic feature of which it is to be _immediate_, or not to be demonstrated through a middle term. Aristotle adds that the genuine Syllogism, which demonstrates through a middle term, is by nature prior and more effective as to cognition; but that the Syllogism from Induction is _to us_ plainer and clearer.[56] [Footnote 52: Analyt. Prior. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 15: [Greek: e)pagôgê\ me\n ou)=n e)sti\ kai\ o( e)x e)pagôgê=s sullogismo\s to\ dia\ tou= e(te/rou tha/teron a)/kron tô=| me/sô| sullogi/sasthai; oi(=on ei) tô=n AG me/son to\ B, dia\ tou= G dei=xai to\ A tô=| B u(pa/rchon; ou(/tô ga\r poiou/metha ta\s e)pagôga/s.] Waitz in his note (p. 532) says: "Fit Inductio, cum per minorem terminum demonstratur _medium prædicari de majore_." This is an erroneous explanation. It should have been: "demonstratur _majorem prædicari de medio_." Analyt. Prior. II. xxiii. 68, b. 32: [Greek: kai\ tro/pon tina\ a)ntikei=tai ê( e)pagôgê\ tô=| sullogismô=|; o( me\n ga\r dia\ tou= me/sou to\ a)/kron tô=| tri/tô| dei/knusin, ê( de\ dia\ tou= tri/tou to\ a)/kron tô=| me/sô|.]]