expressed in forms which suppose universal propositions to be already attained. I will here add that, though Aldrich himself (as I stated at the beginning of this note) treats the argument from Induction as a defective or informal Syllogism, his anonymous Oxonian editor and commentator takes a sounder view. He says (pp. 176, 177, 184, ed. 1823. Oxon.):-- "The principles acquired by human powers may be considered as twofold. Some are _intuitive_, and are commonly called Axioms; the other class of general principles are those acquired by Induction. But it may be doubted whether this distinction is correct. It is highly probable, if not certain, that those primary Axioms generally esteemed _intuitive_, are in fact acquired by an inductive process; although that process is less discernible, because it takes place long before we think of tracing the actings of our own minds. It is often found necessary to facilitate the understanding of those Axioms, when they are first proposed to the judgment, by illustrations drawn from individual cases. But whether it is, as is generally supposed, the mere _enunciation_ of the principle, or the _principle itself_, which requires the illustration, may admit of a doubt. It seems probable, however that, such illustrations are nothing more than a recurrence to the original method by which the knowledge of those principles was acquired. Thus, the repeated trial or observation of the necessary connection between mathematical coincidence and equality, first authorizes the general position or Axiom relative to that subject. If this conjecture is founded in fact, it follows that both _primary_ and _ultimate_ principles have the same nature and are alike acquired by the exercise of the inductive faculty." "Those who acquiesce in the preceding observations will feel a regret to find _Induction_ classed among defective or informal Syllogisms. It is in fact prior in its order to Syllogism; nor can syllogistic reasoning he carried on to any extent without previous Induction" (p. 184).]