conditions of consistency; but the smaller Logic ought to be (at least, finally) studied as part of the greater--as a portion of the means to the same end; and its relation to the other parts--to the other means--should be distinctly displayed."] After adverting to another variety of ratiocinative procedure, which he calls _Apagoge_ or Abduction (where the minor is hardly more evident than the conclusion, and might sometimes conveniently become a conclusion first to be proved),[75] Aristotle goes on to treat of Objection generally--the function of the dialectical respondent. The _Enstasis_ or Objection is a proposition opposed not to a conclusion, but to the proposition set up by the defendant. When the proposition set up by him is universal, as it must be if he seeks to establish an universal conclusion, your objection may be either universal or particular: you may deny either the whole of his proposition, or only one portion of the particulars contained under it; the denial of one single particular, when substantiated, being enough to overthrow his universal. Accordingly, your objection, being thus variously opposed to the proposition, will lie in the syllogistic figures which admit opposite conclusions; that is, either in the First or Third; for the Second figure admits only negative conclusions not opposed to each other. If the defendant has set up an Universal Affirmative, you may deny the whole and establish a contrary negative, in the First figure; or you may deny a part only, and establish a contradictory negative, in the Third figure. The like, if he has set up an Universal Negative: you may impugn it either by an universal contrary affirmative, in the First figure; or by a particular contradictory affirmative, in the Third figure.[76] [Footnote 75: Analyt. Prior. II. xxv. p. 69, a. 20-36.] [Footnote 76: Ibid. II. xxvi. p. 69, a. 37-b. 37. In objecting to A _universally_, you take a term comprehending the original subject; in objecting _particularly_, a term comprehended by it. Of the new term in each case you deny the original predicate, and have thus, as a major premiss, E. For a minor premiss, you affirm, in the first case, the new term as predicate of the original subject (less comprehensive); in the second case, the original subject (more comprehensive) as predicate of the new term. This gives you, in the first case, a conclusion in _Celarent_ (Fig. I.), and, in the second, a conclusion in _Felapton_ (Fig. III.); opposed, the one universally or contrarily, the other particularly or contradictorily, to the original proposition.]