Julius Pacius, ad Analyt. Post. I. viii. (he divides the chapters differently), p. 417, says:--"Differentia interrogationis dialecticæ et demonstrativæ hæc est. Dialecticus ita interrogat, ut optionem det adversario, utrum malit affirmare an negare. Demonstrator vero interrogat ut rem evidentiorem faciat; id est, ut doceat ex principiis auditori notis."] [Footnote 37: Ibid. I. xii. p. 77, b. 1-15; Themistius, p. 41: [Greek: ou) ga\r ô(/sper tô=n e)ndo/xôn oi( polloi\ kritai/, ou(/tô kai\ tô=n kat' e)pistê/mên oi( a)nepistê/mones].] [Footnote 38: Analyt. Post. I. xii. p. 77, b. 16-33. Propositions within the limits of the science, but false as to matter, are styled by Aristotle [Greek: pseudographê/mata]. See Aristot. Sophist. Elench. xi. p. 171, b. 14; p. 172, a. 1. "L'interrogation syllogistique se confondant avec la proposition, il s'ensuit que l'interrogation doit être, comme la proposition, propre à la science dont il s'agit." (Barthélemy St Hilaire, note, p. 70). Interrogation here has a different meaning from that which it bears in Dialectic.] [Footnote 39: Ibid. I. xii. p. 77**, b. 34 seq. This passage is to me hardly intelligible. It is differently understood by commentators and translators. John Philoponus in the Scholia (p. 217, b. 17-32, Brandis), cites the explanation of it given by Ammonius, but rejects that explanation, and waits for others to supply him with a better. Zabarella (Comm. in Analyt. Post. pp. 426, 456, ed. Venet 1617) admits that as it stands, and where it stands, it is unintelligible, but transposes it to another part of the book (to the end of cap. xvii., immediately before the words [Greek: phanero\n de\ kai\ o(/ti], &c., of c. xviii.), and gives an explanation of it in this altered position. But I do not think he has succeeded in clearing it up.] [Footnote 40: Ibid. I. xii. p. 77, b. 40-p. 78, a. 13.]