Of these four heads, however, the first and second are rapidly dismissed by Aristotle in the Metaphysica,[16] being conceived as having little reference to real essence, and therefore belonging more to Logic than to Ontology; _i.e._ to the subjective processes of naming, predicating, believing, and inferring rather than to the objective world of Perceivables and Cogitables.[17] It is the third and fourth that are treated in the Metaphysica; while it is the fourth only (_Ens_ according to the ten figures of the Categories) which is set forth and elucidated in this first treatise of the Organon, where Aristotle appears to blend Logic and Ontology into one. [Footnote 16: Aristot. Metaph. E. p. 1027, b. 16, p. 1028. a. 6.] [Footnote 17: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: Th]. 10, p. 1051, b. 2-15, with Schwegler's Comment, p. 186. This is the distinction drawn by Simplikius (Schol. ad Categ. p. 76, b. 47) between the Organon and the Metaphysica: [Greek: Ai( ga\r a)rchai\ kata\ me\n tê/n sêmantikê\n au)tô=n le/xin e)n tê=| logikê=| pragmatei/a| dêlou=ntai, kata\ de\ ta\ sêmaino/mena e)n tê=| Meta\ ta\ Phusika\ oi)kei/ôs.] [Greek: Ta\ o)/nta] are equivalent to [Greek: ta\ lego/mena], in this and the other logical treatises of Aristotle. Categ. p. 1, a. 16-20, b. 25; Analyt. Prior. i. p. 43, a. 25. This is the logical aspect of Ontology; that is, Entia are considered as Objects to be named, and to serve as Subjects or Predicates for propositions: every such term having a fixed denotation, and (with the exception of proper names) a fixed connotation, known to speakers and hearers. [Greek: Ta\ lego/mena] (or Entia considered in this aspect) are distinguished by Aristotle into two classes: 1. [Greek: Ta\ lego/mena _kata\ sumplokê/n_, oi(=on a)/nthrôpos tre/chei, a)/nthropos nika=|.] 2. [Greek: Ta\ lego/mena _a)/neu sumplokê=s_] (or [Greek: kata\ mêdemi/an sumplokê/n]) [Greek: oi(=on a)/nthrôpos, bou=s, tre/chei, nika=|.] We are to observe here, that in Logic the Proposition or Enunciation is the Prius Naturâ, which must be presupposed as known before we can understand what the separate terms are (Analytic. Prior. i. p. 24, a. 16): just as the right angle must be understood before we can explain what is an acute or an obtuse angle (to use an illustration of Aristotle; see Metaphys. Z. p. 1035, b. 7). We must understand the entire logical act, called Affirming or Denying, before we can understand the functions of the two factors or correlates with which that act is performed. Aristotle defines the Term by means of the Proposition, [Greek: o(/ron de\ kalô= ei) o)\n dialu/etai ê( pro/tasis] (Anal. Pr. i. 24, b. 16).