[Footnote 20: Aristot. Categ. p. 3, a. 20. It appears that Andronikus did not draw the line between these two classes of predicates in same manner as Aristotle: he included many non-essential predicates in [Greek: ta\ kath' u(pokeime/nou]. See Simplikius, ad Categorias, Basil. 1551, fol. 13, 21, B. Nor was either Alexander or Porphyry careful to observe the distinction between the two classes. See Schol. ad Metaphys. p. 701. b. 23, Br.; Schol. ad De Interpret. p. 106, a. 29, Br. And when Aristotle says, Analyt. Prior. i. p. 24, b. 26, [Greek: to\ de\ e)n o(/lô| ei)nai e(/teron e(te/rô|, kai\ to\ kata\ panto\s katêgorei=sthai thate/rou tha/teron, tau)to/n e)stin], he seems himself to forget the distinction entirely.] [Footnote 21: Categor. p. 2, a. 15, seq. In Aristotle phraseology it is not said that Second Essences are contained in First Essences, but that First Essences are contained in Second Essences, _i.e._ in the species which Second Essences signify. See the Scholion to p. 3, a. 9, in Waitz, vol. i. p. 32.] [Footnote 22: Arist. Categ. p. 1, a. 26; b. 7: [Greek: A)nplô=s de\ ta\ a)/toma kai\ e(\n a)rithmô=| kat' ou)deno\s u(pokeime/nou le/getai, e)n u(pokeime/nô| de\ e(/nia ou)de\n kôlu/ei ei)=nai; ê( ga/r tis grammatikê\ tô=n e)n u(pokeime/nô| e)sti/n.] Aristotle here recognizes an attribute as "individual and as numerically one;" and various other logicians have followed him. But is it correct to say, that an attribute, when it cannot be farther divided specifically, and is thus the lowest in its own predicamental series, is _Unum Numero_? The attribute may belong to an indefinite number of different objects; and can we count it as _One_, in the same sense in which we count each of these objects as _One_? I doubt whether _Unum Numero_ be applicable to attributes. Aristotle declares that the [Greek: deute/ra ou)si/a] is not _Unum Numero_ like the [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a--ou) ga\r e)n e)sti to\ u(pokei/menon Ô(/sper ê( prô/tê ou)si/a, a)lla\ kata\ pollô=n o( a)/nthrôpos le/getai kai\ to\ zô=|on (Categ. p. 3, b. 16). Upon the same principle, I think, he ought to declare that the attribute is not _Unum Numero_; for though it is not (in his language) _predicable of_ many Subjects, yet it is _in_ many Subjects. It cannot correctly be called _Unum Numero_, according to the explanation which he gives of that phrase in two passages of the Metaphysica, B. p. 999, b. 33; [Greek: D]. p. 1016, b. 32: [Greek: a)rithmô=| me\n ô(=n ê( u(/lê mi/a], &c.]