We have suggested that, if mathematics may be taken as the intellectual analogue of music, then it is not perhaps too far-fetched to say that such a science as physics may be taken as the intellectual analogue of literature, since both are concerned to interpret what we call the real in terms of what we call the ideal, while the two former arts are not concerned with the real. And the question arises whether the arts, mathematics, and music, which are not concerned to illuminate experience, are worthy of serious attention. In the case of mathematics the answer is not doubtful, since it has repeatedly shown itself applicable to real happenings, however little notions of utility may have played a part, or need have played a part, in its creation. Even the most remote mathematical theorems are not certainly immune from practical application. But no such claim can be made for music, and it is for that reason that to some philosophers music is a pleasing but essentially trivial art. To such philosophers music, while it may suggest spiritual profundities, is, after all, saying nothing of any possible significance. The adventures of the soul that it depicts are less significant even than a stage fight. Its one justification is the pleasure it affords; it takes us out of ourselves in a way no other art can do, and after this refreshing interregnum we return to the things that matter. It may be so; we can give no proof that it is not so; we can only say we find the point of view incredible. On this point, again, we certainly find the mystical view of Schopenhauer, if less intelligible, at least more convincing than that of common sense. HUMAN TESTIMONY