To this the Court replied: "I do not know whether it is understood or not. I cannot understand it, because I am bound not to know the witnesses, either as regards their own private character, or the character of their testimony, and I enter into the trial of this case knowing nothing, as it were, about either, scarcely ever having glanced at the testimony, and of course, therefore, I cannot enter into the feelings of counsel on the subject. I do not know to what witnesses these remarks may be directed, but this I do know, that there are certain legal methods pointed out in the text books of the law by which we are to be guided in undertaking to discredit the testimony of witnesses. One method is the discrediting of the witness by himself; by his own contradictions, and by his mode and manner of testifying. Another is by proving the witness to be utterly devoid of reputation for truth and veracity, and not to be believed on his oath. Another is by contradicting him by the conflicting testimony of other witnesses. These are the legal modes that are pointed out in the law books, and any side remarks that are made by way of prejudicing a jury, any acting in the case, the casting of sinister looks at the jury, are departures from the rules laid down. "The examination of a witness ought to be conducted by the witness standing up and the counsel standing up, and looking each other in the face, without the counsel directing his remarks to the jury by turning towards them instead of turning towards the witness. That is the proper way to conduct either an examination in chief or a cross-examination." The fact that the Court deemed it necessary to deliver such a lecture as this to counsel, who were men of age and experience in their profession, and who from their reading ought to have been as well informed as the Court on the proper treatment of a witness and the legal methods of discrediting testimony, indicates that he had found in their conduct such flagrant departures from the requirements of law and professional conduct a necessity for such criticism and such admonitions. The opinion of the Court as thus expressed fully justifies me in the charges I have made against the conduct of the defense and their unprofessional efforts to discredit testimony. I am still further justified in it by the remark of Mr. Merrick that they (the counsel for the defense) "had laid at the feet of the attorneys a mass of the most corrupt battalion that was ever summoned to support a cause in a criminal court."