offense may also have been committed against the laws of war; for that offense he must answer to the laws of war, and the tribunals legalized by that law. There is, then, an apparent but no real conflict in the constitutional provisions. Offenses against the laws of war must be dealt with and punished under the Constitution, as the laws of war, they being a part of the law of nations, direct; crimes must be dealt with and punished as the Constitution, and laws made in pursuance thereof, may direct. Congress has not undertaken to define the code of war nor to punish offenses against it. In the case of a spy, Congress has undertaken to say who shall be deemed a spy and how he shall be punished. But every lawyer knows that a spy was a well known offender under the laws of war, and that under, and according, to these laws he could have been tried and punished without an act of Congress. This is admitted by the act of Congress when it says that he shall suffer death "according to the laws and usages of war." The act is simply declaratory of the law. That portion of the Constitution which declares that no "person shall be deprived of his life, liberty or property without due process of law" has such direct reference to and connection with trials for _crime_ and _criminal_ prosecutions, that comment upon it would seem to be unnecessary. Trials for offenses against the laws of war are not embraced nor intended to be embraced in these provisions. If this is not so, then every man who kills another in battle is a murderer, for he deprived a "person of life without that due process of law" contemplated by this provision; every soldier that marches across a field in battle array is liable to an action for trespass, because he does so without that due process of law. The argument that flings around offenders against the laws of war these guarantees of the Constitution would convict all the soldiers of our army of murder; no prisoners could be taken and held; the army could not move.