"The Arbitration Court has not hitherto been in the habit of giving reasons for its decision. It appears to the Court that, sitting as arbitrators, it should as a general rule follow the ordinary practice of arbitrators and simply give its decision without reasons. In the present case, however, so far as I myself am concerned, I think it is desirable that I should, with respect to part of the award, give some indications of the reasons which have induced the Court to arrive at its conclusion. The part of the award to which I refer is that which relates to clauses 1 and 2 of the general rules which the Manufacturers' Association has submitted to the Court: '1. (_a_) It is the individual right of the employer to decide whom he shall employ or dismiss. (_b_) It is the individual right of the workman to accept or refuse work from any employer. {288} 2. Employers or employes, either individually or through any organisation, shall not discriminate for or against any person because he is or is not a member of any organisation, neither shall there be any distinction between organised or non-organised labour; both shall work under the same conditions and receive equal pay for equal work.' The Bootmakers' Union, in opposition to the rules so suggested, put forward the contention that employment should be limited to members of the Bootmakers' Union. The Court, however, is not able to accept the extreme view which has been put forward by the Bootmakers' Union. If it were accepted it might follow that an employer, who had work to do and who could not get Union men to do it, might have to bring his operations to a standstill. The effect of it also would be that non-Union men would be absolutely prevented from earning their living in the workshops of the members of the Manufacturers' Association. That, so far as I am concerned, seems to be going beyond what the Court ought to decree. On the other hand, however, I am not prepared to accept absolutely clauses 1 and 2 in the form in which the Manufacturers' Association has put them forward. The Court ought, I think, to comply with the intention of the Legislature as evidenced in the provisions of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, and ought not to do anything which is calculated to destroy or weaken any industrial organisation. The {289} intention of the Act is indicated in its title--the Act is an Act to encourage the formation of Industrial Unions and Associations. The Court, therefore, ought not to do anything which will tend to destroy or weaken an industrial association, or interfere with the manifest intention of the Legislature as disclosed by the Act. We have this also, that for the last three years the shops of the Manufacturers' Association have been practically working as Union shops. It is true that manufacturers say--probably with truth--that they were so worked because they could not help it, but the fact remains that they have been working in that