The opinion of the minority of the court written by Judge Seevers, and concurred in by Judge Reed, assumes the position that inasmuch as the manufacture for the purpose of export was not prohibited, therefore, it was lawful. The opinion of the majority of the court, it was claimed, was contrary to the language and decision of our supreme court in the cases theretofore decided by the court in Niles v. Fries, 35 Iowa, 41, and Becker v. Betten, 39 Iowa, 668. In the former case in 35 Iowa, Judge Beck himself in delivering the opinion of the court uses the following language: "Intoxicating liquors in the possession of a citizen who holds them for the purpose of selling them lawfully, _within the state_, or for transporting them without the state for lawful traffic, are not, under the statute, subject to seizure." Judge Beck gets rid of the force and effect of his prior decision by saying that his language was "obiter dicta." When, however, the opinion comes to wrestle with the question as to confining the police power of the state, to matters that concern the good order of society and the health of the people of the state, but did not extend to the inhabitants of the other states of the Union, Judge Beck gets rid of this suggestion by claiming that there is a sort of comity between the states by which the legislature of one state ought to consider the well being and happiness of the people of the other states. This suggestion is rather fanciful than otherwise, particularly as applied to this case, for that the other states, particularly New York to which this alcohol was exported, have never undertaken to control either the manufacture, sale, or use of alcoholic spirits. In the interpretation of all statutes and in case of doubt it is a well recognized rule of interpretation that the court must consider what evil it was existing prior to the enactment of the statute that the statute was intended to correct or remedy. The idea that the people of Iowa were seized with a desire to limit the manufacture of alcohol in order to prevent it being taken to New York was simply Utopian and had no real existence. The real parties that were attempting to limit the manufacture of alcohol in Iowa for export was the whisky trust that desired to keep up the price of the article in the New York market, and this fact was well known to the supreme court and to the three judges that concurred in the opinion of the majority. Judge Beck's opinion, aside from the question of law involved, was a very excellent temperance speech against the use of alcohol as a beverage, but had no relation whatever to the case. I write thus freely upon this subject for the reason that Mr. Kauffman and myself had given a written opinion as to the reasonable construction of this law, relying upon the former decisions of our own supreme court and the language of Judge Beck himself. Mr. Kidd had made his investment in good faith in a manufacturing industry,