The vote authorized to be taken upon the adoption of the act, while it is objectionable in a constitutional point of view, as transferring the law-making powers from the legislature to the people, is further objectionable in view of the possible, not to say the probable, result of such vote. We cannot undertake to determine, nor can it, under any circumstances, be foreseen, that the result of the vote will be uniform in all the counties of the state, either in favor of license or against it. In some of the counties the vote may not be taken; in others, the majority may be against license; while in others, the majority may be in its favor. Unanimity of sentiment, either one way or the other, can hardly be reckoned upon. These views, we think, add weight to the argument against the constitutionality of submitting the act to a vote of the people. We do not, however, base wholly upon them our conclusion against the validity of the act in question, nor upon the fact that the result of the vote upon the question of adopting it may not be uniform throughout the state. Upon this latter branch of the subject, the members of the court are not unanimous in opinion. The majority of the court are of the opinion, that while the act must without doubt be deemed to be a law of a general nature, it is liable to objection, as prescribing no uniform rule of civil conduct to the people of the state, and as not providing of itself for its uniform operation. The legislative power must command. It must not leave to the people the choice to obey or not to obey its requirements. It is not a law enacted according to the requirements of the constitution, if there is left to the action and choice of the people upon whom it is to operate the determination of a question which may result in a want of uniformity in the operation of a law of a general nature. I shall take occasion to refer to this decision of the supreme court hereafter when I come to notice the passage by the legislature of the miserable subterfuge now known as the "mulct law." CHAPTER X REGULATION OF FREIGHT AND PASSENGER TARIFFS Leaving the subject of temperance and prohibition for the present, the next important question of a public nature in which I became interested professionally was the question of the regulation of freight and passenger tariffs by the general assembly of the state. The general assembly of 1888 enacted a law providing for the election of three Railroad Commissioners, and gave them authority to prepare schedules of rates that might be charged by the railroads of the state for the transportation of freight and passengers. [Illustration: _Charles Clinton Nourse_ From Photograph by Pearson. Des Moines]