[Footnote 35: See Appendix VI. (Historical documents). (Editor's note).] [Footnote 36: See Appendix VI. (Historical documents). (Editor's note).] [Footnote 37: See Appendix VI. (Historical documents). (Editor's note).] [Footnote 38: See Appendix VI. (Historical documents). (Editor's note).] [Footnote 39: It is true that such measures are recommended in camps of instruction and in publications. But in maneuvers they are neglected in the mania for alignment, and in that other mad desire of generals to mix in details which do not concern them.] [Footnote 40: See Appendix VI. (Historical documents.) (Editor's note.)] [Footnote 41: See Appendix VI. (Historical documents.) (Editor's note.)] [Footnote 42: See Appendix II. (Historical documents.) (Editor's note.)] [Footnote 43: A propos of gaps: At the battle of Sempach thirteen hundred badly armed Swiss opposed three thousand Lorraine knights in phalanxes. The attack of the Swiss in a formation was ineffective, and they were threatened with envelopment. But Arnold von Winkelried created a gap; the Swiss penetrated and the massacre followed.] [Footnote 44: See Appendix II. (Historical documents.) (Editor's note.)] [Footnote 45: See Appendix II. (Historical documents.) (Editor's note.)] [Footnote 46: See Appendix II. (Historical documents.) (Editor's note.)] [Footnote 47: It is hard to determine what method of fire, at command or at will, was used. But what we find in the works of the best military authorities, from Montecuculli to Marshal Saxe, is general opposition to the replacement of the pike by the rifle. All predicted the abandonment of the rifle for the pike, and the future always proved them wrong. They ignored experience. They could not understand that stronger than all logic is the instinct of man, who prefers long range to close fighting, and who, having the rifle would not let it go, but continually improved it.] [Footnote 48: The danger arising from this kind of fire, led to proposals to put the smallest men in the front rank, the tallest in the rear rank.] [Footnote 49: Nothing is more difficult than to estimate range; in nothing is the eye more easily deceived. Practice and the use of instruments cannot make a man infallible. At Sebastopol, for two months, a distance of one thousand to twelve hundred meters could not be determined by the rifle, due to inability to see the shots. For three months it was impossible to measure by ranging shots, although all ranges were followed through, the distance to a certain battery which was only five hundred meters away, but higher and separated from us by a ravine. One day, after three months, two shots at five hundred meters were observed in the target. This distance was estimated by everybody as over one thousand meters; it was only five hundred. The village taken and the point of observation changed, the truth became evident.]