have improved her trim, and putting it further forward would only have been one step better. It was no detriment, but an advantage, from the plaintiff’s point of view, to the ship’s sea-worthiness. He considered the verdict on the present evidence quite unsatisfactory and against the weight of it. He had not overlooked the rule relating to juries, which was sometimes considered to amount to this—that the court should not disturb even an absurd verdict as long as it was not insane. The latest view of the Privy Council in Aitken v. M’Meikan on this point was that which bound the court, and, though it laid down no rule of general application, it was decided on a ground applicable here. The evidence for the plaintiff ran in a different plane from that for the defendants, and regarding that fact and that the jury had never considered the case in its true legal aspect, he thought there must be a new trial. Verdict for plaintiff set aside, and new trial granted, with costs, the costs of the former trial to abide the event of the new trial. MR. JUSTICE HODGES agreed that there should be a new trial. In the face of the evidence, the verdict, he considered, was one which reasonable men could not find. He desired to say nothing as to the extent to which the certificate of the Marine Board was conclusive as to the sea-worthiness of the vessel. MR. JUSTICE HOOD concurred, because he saw no evidence to justify a jury acting by reason and not by sympathy in finding that the defendants had not taken all reasonable care to make this ship sea-worthy. They had done all that the Act of Parliament required them to do. Competent men had examined their vessel, and these men had informed them that there was nothing wrong with her, and that she was perfectly fit to go to sea. As against that the plaintiff had proved nothing, but desired it to be laid down that, no matter what the owners of ships did, if an accident happened and a jury could be persuaded that the defendants were to blame, there was an end of it. In his opinion that would be legislating and not interpreting the Act of Parliament. It would be to say that shipowners were required to warrant the safety and sea-worthiness of their ships, and that was more than the law required them to do. * * * * *