JUSTICE HOLROYD: I concur that there should be a new trial. I do not differ, I think, in any respect from the judgment that has been delivered, although I entertained some doubt as to a portion of it, on which my brother Williams has mainly relied. I have doubted whether sects. 18 and 19 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854 should not be read together as containing a definition of what should be regarded as a British ship, and whether so reading those two sections, the true construction of them was not that a British ship meant a ship belonging to any of the persons described in sect. 18, and registered under the provision of sect. 19. My doubt, however, is not sufficiently strong to induce me to differ from the judgment just delivered. I think that judgment is supported by a reference to the previous Acts relating to registration, particularly the Act 8 and 9 Vict., c. 88, to which I have just directed my attention. It is called, “An Act for the Encouragement of British Shipping and Navigation,” and it speaks of the conditions which are to attach to a British registered ship, and draws clearly a distinction between a “British registered ship” and a “British ship.” I think that throws some light upon, and gives support to, the judgment of my brother Williams. But, in my opinion, it is too late for the defendants now to turn round and set up this ground at all. For years past the defendants have represented themselves as the owners of a duly registered British ship. They have, by so doing, up to this time avoided payment of the penalties prescribed by sect. 53 of the Act for not informing the registrar that the ship had ceased to be effectually registered, and, of course, they avoided it if the argument maintained by Mr. Schutt is correct. I think still it would be contrary to public policy to allow them to come now and declare that during these years they were not the owners of a duly registered British ship. There is a case which I think supports the view I am taking. It is Tabram _v._ Freeman, 2 Cr. & M. 451. In that case an attorney, to whom an insolvent was indebted, and who held a _cognovit_ as a security for the debt, and who was employed by the insolvent to prepare his schedule, and acted as his attorney in procuring his discharge, agreed with the insolvent to omit the debt out of the schedule, and that the _cognovit_ should be suspended until after the discharge, and then revived. The insolvent obtained his discharge, and the attorney two years afterwards entered up judgment on the _cognovit_, and issued execution. The Court, on motion, set aside the judgment and execution, and upon the ground as stated by Gurney, B., at p. 455, that “the plaintiff was the attorney employed by the insolvent, and must be held responsible for the preparation of the schedule. How can he, who prepared the schedule falsely, take advantage of it? It is an act of oppression on the debtor, and a fraud on the law, on the Act, and on the creditors.”