Although less recognition was given to Beaumarchais by the government, the ministers continued to make use of his advice. “At the moment,” says Doniol, “when he was treated with the greatest coldness, his counsels were appropriated.... They used his political estimates almost in the terms in which he expressed himself, sometimes textually. At the end of October he was admitted to discuss with Vergennes and Maurepas the definite stand to take in offering propositions of alliance with the American colonies. Three months later when the King was about to sign the treaty, it was evident that the Secretary of State had demanded of Beaumarchais a résumé of their discussion. This résumé entitled, _Mémoire particulière pour l’Etat_,” was drawn up by Beaumarchais under circumstances peculiarly distressing. It was at the moment when he first realized with absolute certainty that his coöperation in the aid soon to be freely and openly accorded the Americans was no longer desired. Nevertheless, he continued to express himself with the same manly vigor as previously. After setting forth the actual situation of France and Spain with regard to England, he said: “What remains for us to do? “Three courses are open to us. The first is worth nothing, the second is the most sure, the third, the most noble; but a wise combination of the third and second could instantly raise the King of France to be the first power of the civilized world. “The first course, which is worth nothing, absolutely nothing, is to continue to do what we are doing, or rather what we are not doing; to remain longer passive by the side of the turbulent activity of our neighbors, and obstinately to refuse to take sides while still awaiting events.” After setting forth at length the actual condition of affairs in England, the perils which menaced France, the desire which actuated all parties in Great Britain to make peace with America while wreaking their vengeance upon France, he continues warningly, “But the first step towards peace being once taken, be sure that it will be too late for France to declare in favor of America.” Then follows a narration of preparations then making in England to take France unawares. “After having become the laughing stock of all Europe,” cries the daring advocate of the alliance, “a fatal war and the bankruptcy of America will be the worthy reward of our inaction. “The worst course therefore, of all the courses, is now, to take no course and to attempt none in conjunction with America, waiting until England shall have closed up every way; something which will certainly happen very shortly.