A still more curious case was that of the battle of Ypres. During a whole fortnight the official placards daily informed the Belgians of the latest German success ... and at the end of three weeks the army was still as far from Ypres. The whole of this Yser campaign is interesting as throwing a light upon the German mentality. From the outset the Germans tried to establish a confusion between the "canalized" Yser and the "canalized" Yperlée, that is, the canal running from Ypres to the Yser. What they call "the canal of the Yser" in their placard of the 22nd October is the canalized Yser between Dixmude and Nieuport. In the placard of the 2nd November they spoke of the "canal from the Yser to Ypres, near Nieuport," an absolutely fantastic description. Finally, on the 4th April, when they claimed to have crossed "the Yser canal" to occupy Driegrachten, it was really the Yperlée that was in question, and not the Yser at all. This is, as will be seen, on a par with the intentional confusion which they sought to create between the city of Liége and its forts (pp. 50, 58). Such confusions may deceive the Germans, but the Belgians, familiar with the geography of their country, naturally laugh at them. Another point relating to this astonishing campaign on the Yser: On the 2nd November the Germans announced that operations were rendered difficult by the inundation. On the following day, having expressed their pity for the Belgians "whose fields were devastated for a long time to come," they added that the water was in parts deeper than a man's height, but that they had lost neither man, nor horse, nor gun. How can they impose such idle stuff on people who know the _polders_ of the coast region, with their innumerable canals and ditches, and who know, moreover, than an inundation there renders all retreat impossible? 3. CYNICISM.