During the long period of armed peace which followed, while the Powers formed, on one side the "Triplice" (1883), on the other the "Duplice" (1891) and the Entente Cordiale (1904), while armies and fleets were increased tenfold and German aggressive policy asserted itself more and more acutely, Belgium's defences were only slowly reinforced, in spite of the desperate efforts of disinterested patriots and of the stern warnings of the kings. The name of Leopold II must be associated here with that of Albert I. Both were prompted in their action by the same motives that inspired Leopold I's policy. They placed security on a level with, and even above, prosperity. Standing aloof from party intrigues, they were in a position to appeal to all patriots without distinction, and to make use of the services of a little band of clear-sighted citizens who saw the centre of danger transferred from France to Germany, and watched the young Empire's military and economic development with growing anxiety. Foremost among them stood Emile Banning, author of a prophetic report on the Meuse defences (1881-86). Nothing illustrated more clearly the crippling influence of neutrality on Belgian international thought than the way this man of genius was ignored by his fellow-citizens. In any other country, he would have exercised a considerable influence on public opinion. In Belgium, he was only heard by a few statesmen and, happily, by Leopold II, who no doubt had his report in mind when, in 1887, he warned one of his ministers of the necessity of Belgium not only safeguarding her independence, but "preventing the passage" of foreign troops through her territory. Germany had now become the main source of danger, but in order to avoid all criticism it was decided to build two bridgeheads, one at Namur and the other at Liege. The first commanded the upper valley of the Meuse, the second the middle course of the stream; one was facing France, the other Germany. The plan of defence was consequently developed, the forts enabling the army to make a short stand before retiring into the entrenched camp of Antwerp. It is largely to Banning's clearsightedness and to Leopold II's firm attitude that Western Europe owes the respite given by the resistance of Liege in August 1914. Had not General Brialmont's original plans of the forts been unduly curtailed, this resistance would have proved still more effective. [_MILITARY REFORM_]