This supreme satisfaction was not unmixed. Important concessions had had to be made. The voluntary system was maintained to a certain extent, only one son per family being called up for a short time (fifteen months). The passing of the Bill was a victory in principle, but it only increased very slightly the strength of the Belgian army. The Pan-German campaign was in full swing by then. Maps were published, beyond the Rhine, showing large portions of Belgium painted in imperial red, like the rest of the Reich. Pamphlets and books appeared claiming Antwerp as a German port and connecting East Africa with the German Cameroons through the Belgian Congo. Still the majority of the Belgians would not believe that such views were shared by the German Emperor and his Government. It was only after the Agadir coup (1911) and Algeciras (1912) that M. de Broqueville, Minister of War, strongly supported by King Albert, was able to carry through a Bill introducing general and compulsory service, which would have placed the army on a proper footing if its provisions had been rendered immediately effective. Unhappily, the Bill only provided for a gradual increase, the army reaching its full strength of 340,000 men in 1917. This last reservation proved nearly fatal to the country, for, when mobilization was ordered, in July 1914, the total forces available only amounted to 117,000 men, of which the combatant portion was reduced to 93,000 bayonets--an increase of only 10,000 over the effectives of 1870. There are few subjects so depressing as the slow development of Belgian defences under the threat of invasion. Each time the situation became serious, as in 1848, 1852, 1908 and 1911, public opinion allowed some progress to be made. But it came always too late. The people were ready to face their responsibilities, but they could not be made to realize them. Blindly relying on the 1839 treaties, absorbed in their economic and intellectual development, they showed little interest in international affairs. Those who did, found themselves in the dilemma either of taking refuge in a fools' paradise or of powerlessly facing an ever-growing menace. Neutrality may have saved Belgium in 1870, full independence might have saved her in 1914. CHAPTER XXVII ECONOMIC RENAISSANCE