It will be said, perhaps, that _God permits evil Actions to be done, for_ wise _Ends and Purposes_. But this Objection destroys itself; for whatever an infinitely good God hath wise Ends in suffering to _be_, must be good, is thereby made good, and cannot be otherwise. VI. _If a Creature is made by God, it must depend upon God, and receive all its Power from Him, with which Power the Creature can do nothing contrary to the Will of God, because God is Almighty; what is not contrary to His Will, must be agreeable to it; what is agreeable to it, must be good, because He is Good; therefore a Creature can do nothing but what is good._ This Proposition is much to the same Purpose with the former, but more particular; and its Conclusion is as just and evident. Tho' a Creature may do many Actions which by his Fellow Creatures will be nam'd _Evil_, and which will naturally and necessarily cause or bring upon the Doer, certain _Pains_ (which will likewise be call'd _Punishments_;) yet this Proposition proves, that he cannot act what will be in itself really Ill, or displeasing to God. And that the painful Consequences of his evil Actions (_so call'd_) are not, as indeed they ought not to be, _Punishments_ or Unhappinesses, will be shewn hereafter. Nevertheless, the late learned Author of _The Religion of Nature_, (which I send you herewith) has given us a Rule or Scheme, whereby to discover which of our Actions ought to be esteem'd and denominated _good_, and which _evil_; It is in short this, "Every Action which is done according to _Truth_, is good; and every Action contrary to Truth, is evil: To act according to Truth is to use and esteem every Thing as what it is, &c. Thus if _A_ steals a Horse from _B_, and rides away upon him, he uses him not as what he is in Truth, _viz._ the Property of another, but as his own, which is contrary to Truth, and therefore _evil_." But, as this Gentleman himself says, (Sect. I. Prop. VI.) "In order to judge rightly what any Thing is, it must be consider'd, not only what it is in one Respect, but also what it may be in any other Respect; and the whole Description of the Thing ought to be taken in: So in this Case it ought to be consider'd, that _A_ is naturally a _covetous_ Being, feeling an Uneasiness in the want of _B's_ Horse, which produces an Inclination for stealing him, stronger than his Fear of Punishment for so doing. This is _Truth_ likewise, and _A_ acts according to it when he steals the Horse. Besides, if it is prov'd to be a _Truth_, that _A_ has not Power over his own Actions, it will be indisputable that he acts according to Truth, and impossible he should do otherwise.