In his valuable book, “Direct Legislation,” J. W. Sullivan thus recounts what the Swiss have done by direct legislation: “They have made it easy at any time to alter their cantonal or federal constitutions—that is, to change, even radically, the organization of society, the social contract, and thus to permit a peaceful revolution at the will of the majority. They have as well cleared from the way of majority rule every obstacle—privilege of ruler, fetter of ancient law, power of legislator. They have simplified the structure of government, held their officials as servants, rendered bureaucracy impossible, converted their representatives to simple committeemen, and shown the parliamentary system not essential to law-making. They have written their laws in language so plain that a layman may be judge in the highest court. They have forestalled monopolies, improved and reduced taxation, avoided incurring heavy public debts, and made a better distribution of their land than any other European country. They have practically given home rule in local affairs to every community. They have calmed disturbing political elements; the press is purified, the politician disarmed, the civil service well regulated. Hurtful partisanship is passing away. Since the people as a whole will never willingly surrender their sovereignty, reactionary movement is possible only in case the nation should go backward. But the way is open forward. Social ideals may be realized in act and institution. Even now the liberty-loving Swiss citizen can discern in the future a freedom in which every individual—independent, possessed of rights in nature’s resources and in command of the fruits of his toil—may, at his will, on the sole condition that he respect the like aim of other men, pursue his happiness.” Proportional Representation. The term proportional representation has come to be generally applied to a method of electing representatives whereby the representation shall be in proportion to the votes polled by the several parties, or groups of voters, as against the present method of electing them from single districts by a plurality vote. To effect this end numerous plans have been put forth. The _cumulative vote_ allows the voter as many votes as there are representatives to be elected and permits him to distribute them as he pleases among the candidates. This method is applied in a limited degree to the choice of members of the lower house of the Illinois legislature. Each district elects three members, and the voter can cast three votes for one candidate, one and a half votes for two, or one vote each for three. With the _limited or restricted vote_ the voter has a less number of votes than the number of representatives to be elected. Thus in the city of Boston the new law allows the voter to vote for only seven aldermen on one ticket, and declares the twelve candidates receiving the highest vote elected.