Bismarck : $b some secret pages of his history (Vol. 1 of 3). Being a diary kept by Dr. Moritz Busch during twenty-five years' official and private intercourse with the great ChancellorBusch, Moritz
History
Bismarck : $b some secret pages of his history (Vol. 1 of 3). Being a diary kept by Dr. Moritz Busch during twenty-five years' official and private intercourse with the great Chancellor
Busch, Moritz
Bismarck, Otto, Fürst von, 1815-1898
going in the direction of Donchery, whither I follow them.
The Minister repeatedly related the occurrences of this morning and the
preceding night. In the following paragraphs I unite all these various
statements into a connected whole. The sense of what the Chancellor
said is faithfully given throughout, and his own words are in great
part reproduced.
“After the battle of the 1st of September, Moltke and I went to
Donchery, about five kilometres from Sedan, for the purpose of carrying
on the negotiations with the French. We spent the night there, the King
and his suite returning to Vendresse. The negotiations lasted until
midnight, without, however, leading to an understanding. In addition
to Moltke and myself, Blumenthal and three or four other officers
of the general staff were present. General Wimpffen was the French
spokesman. Moltke’s demand was very short. The whole French army must
surrender as prisoners of war. Wimpffen considered that too hard.
The army had deserved better treatment by the gallantry it had shown
in action. We ought to be content to let them go on condition that
they took no further part in the war, and removed to some district in
France to be fixed upon by us, or to Algiers. Moltke quietly maintained
his demand. Wimpffen dwelt upon his own unfortunate position. He had
joined the troops two days before on his return from Africa, and
only took over the command when MacMahon was wounded towards the
close of the battle--and yet he must now put his signature to such
a capitulation. He would rather try to hold the fortress or venture
a sortie. Moltke regretted that it was impossible for him to make
allowance for the position of the general, the hardship of which he
appreciated. He recognised the gallantry of the French troops, but they
could not possibly hold Sedan, and a sortie was out of the question.
He was prepared to allow one of the general’s officers to inspect
our positions, in order that he might convince himself of that fact.
Wimpffen then urged that from a political standpoint it was advisable
to grant better terms. We must desire a speedy and permanent peace, and
we could now secure it if we acted generously. A considerate treatment
of the army would put both the soldiers and the whole people under an
obligation of gratitude, and would inspire friendly feelings towards
us. An opposite course would lead to endless war. I intervened at this
point, as my trade came into question here. I told Wimpffen it was
possible to trust to the gratitude of a Prince but not to that of a
people, and least of all to that of the French. They had no permanent
institutions, they were constantly changing governments and dynasties,
which were not bound by what their predecessors had undertaken. If the
Emperor’s throne were secure it would be possible to count upon his
gratitude in return for more favourable conditions. As matters stood it
would be foolish not to avail themselves to the full of the advantages
of our success.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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