In connection with the news that the King has gone to Clayes in order to prevent an attack being made by our troops, the Chief, in the course of conversation at dinner, said, amongst other things, that “many of our generals have abused the devotion of the troops in order to secure victory.” “Possibly,” he added, “the hard-hearted reprobates of the general staff are right when they say that even if the whole five hundred thousand men whom we have now in France were to be wiped out, that should merely be regarded as the loss of so many pawns, so long as we ultimately won the game. It is very simple strategy, however, to plunge in head foremost in that way without counting the cost. Altogether, those who conduct the operations are often not worth much--armchair strategists. A plan is prepared in which the whole calculation is based first of all upon the extraordinary qualities of both soldiers and regimental officers. It is these who alone have achieved everything. Our success is due to the fact that our soldiers are physically stronger than the French, that they can march better, have more patience and sense of duty, and are more impetuous in attack. If MacMahon had commanded Prussian soldiers and Alvensleben Frenchmen, the latter would have been defeated--although he is my friend.” “It is no longer possible, as it was in the Seven Years’ War, to direct a battle from the saddle--the armies are too large. There is also no genuine co-operation and mutual assistance. Battles begin usually like those described by Homer. Some of the men commence with small provocations, and go on taunting each other, then they begin to shoot; the others see this and rush forward, and so finally the engagement becomes general.” “The plan of surrounding the enemy is the right one, and properly speaking that was only adopted at Sedan. The engagement of the 16th at Metz was quite correct, as it was necessary there at any cost to prevent the French from escaping. The sacrifice of the guards on the 18th however was not necessary. It was a piece of pure folly, occasioned by jealousy of the Saxons. They ought to have waited at Saint Privat until the Saxons had completed their manœuvre for cutting off the enemy.” Keudell and Bohlen afterwards ascribed this unfavourable criticism to a quarrel which the Chief had had with Moltke at Reims.