Bismarck : $b some secret pages of his history (Vol. 1 of 3). Being a diary kept by Dr. Moritz Busch during twenty-five years' official and private intercourse with the great ChancellorBusch, Moritz
History
Bismarck : $b some secret pages of his history (Vol. 1 of 3). Being a diary kept by Dr. Moritz Busch during twenty-five years' official and private intercourse with the great Chancellor
Busch, Moritz
Bismarck, Otto, Fürst von, 1815-1898
Naturally these particulars were not communicated to the Duc de
FitzJames by his informant. They would have fully excused the burning
of the village even if it had been done intentionally with the object
of forcing the enemy out of that position. But there is no evidence of
any such intention. That women and children were driven back into the
fire is one of those infamous lies with which the French terrorise the
population, and incite their hatred against us. In this way they cause
the peasants to fly on our approach. The latter return, however, as a
rule, a few days after the entrance of the Germans, and are astounded
to find that they are better treated by them than by the French troops.
When this sort of terrorism is not sufficient to force the inhabitants
to flight, the Government sends a mob of armed civilians, sometimes
supported by African troops, to drive the peasants from their homes at
the point of the sword, and to burn down their houses as a punishment
for their want of patriotism. The letter of ‘an imprisoned officer’
(Bouillon, September 9th) also contains more falsehood than truth.
With respect to the treatment of the prisoners, Germany can call
150,000 better witnesses than this anonymous and mendacious officer,
whose whole communication is merely an expression of the vindictive
disposition which will for a long time to come inspire the vain and
arrogant elements of the French people, by whom, unfortunately, that
country allows itself to be ruled and led. From this spirit of revenge
arises the certainty of further attacks on the part of France, for
which Germany must be prepared. We are thus unquestionably compelled
to think solely of the security of our frontier in concluding peace.
It is true, as stated in the letter of this imprisoned officer, M. L.,
that there was a scarcity of provisions after the surrender of Sedan,
not only for the prisoners, but also for the victors, who shared with
them what they had. When their own stock was exhausted the prisoners
also had to do without. L.’s complaint that he had been obliged to
bivouac in the rain and mud furnishes the best evidence that he is no
officer, and has not even followed the campaign up to that point. He
is some hireling scribe who has never left his own room, and one must
therefore assume that the man’s whole story of his imprisonment is
an invention; as, had he been an officer in the field, he would have
known that most of his comrades (that is certainly the case with the
Germans) have spent at least thirty nights out of the forty or so that
have elapsed since the beginning of the war under similar conditions.
When it rained in the night they had to lie in the rain, and when the
ground was muddy they had to lie in the mud. Only one who had not
followed the campaign could have any doubt or manifest any surprise on
that score. That M. L. prides himself on having retained his leather
purse is the clearest proof that he was not plundered. There can hardly
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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