“The principal reason why the bombardment is delayed,” said the Chancellor, “is the sentimentality of the Queen of England, and the interference of Queen Augusta.... That seems to be a characteristic of the Hohenzollerns--their women folk have always a great influence upon them. It was not so with Frederick the Great, but with his successor and the late King, as well as the present Most Gracious and his future Majesty. The most curious example is that of Prince Charles, who is anything but a good husband, and yet depends upon his wife, indeed he is thoroughly afraid of her and is guided by her wishes.... But it is somewhat different with these two (the King and the Crown Prince). They want to be praised. They like to have it said in the English and French press that they are considerate and generous. They find that the Germans praise them enough as it is.” It appears that Delbrück has not expressed himself very clearly in his telegram respecting the prospect of the agreement with Bavaria being sanctioned by the Diet. It seems as if there were not sufficient members present to form the necessary quorum, and that it would be opposed both by the Progressists and National Liberals. The Chief observed: “So far as the Progressists are concerned, their conduct is consistent. They wish to return to the state of affairs which prevailed in 1849. But the National Liberals? If they will not have now what they were striving for with all their might at the beginning of the year, in February, and what it now depends upon them to secure, then we must dissolve. The new elections will weaken the Progressist party still more, and some of the National Liberals will also lose their seats. But in that case the Treaties would not be completed. Bavaria would reconsider the matter; Beust would put his finger in the pie, and we do not know what the result would be. I cannot well go to Berlin. It is a very uncomfortable journey and takes up a lot of time, and besides I am really wanted here.” Proceeding from this point the Minister spoke of the position of affairs in 1848. “At that period the situation was for a long time very favourable for the unification of Germany under Prussia. The smaller Sovereigns were for the most part powerless and despondent. If they could only save their money, their domains and their appropriations they were prepared to consent to everything. The Austrians were engaged with Hungary and Italy. The Tsar Nicholas would not have intervened at that time. If they had only acted in a resolute way previous to May, 1849, and come to terms with the smaller States they would doubtless have carried the South with them, particularly if the Würtemberg and Bavarian armies joined the Baden revolution, which was not impossible at that stage. Time was lost, however, through hesitation and half measures, and so the opportunity was thrown away.”