Bismarck : $b some secret pages of his history (Vol. 1 of 3). Being a diary kept by Dr. Moritz Busch during twenty-five years' official and private intercourse with the great ChancellorBusch, Moritz
History
Bismarck : $b some secret pages of his history (Vol. 1 of 3). Being a diary kept by Dr. Moritz Busch during twenty-five years' official and private intercourse with the great Chancellor
Busch, Moritz
Bismarck, Otto, Fürst von, 1815-1898
The Chief: “Or with the colours of the German Knights, a white ribbon
with small black stripes. It looks very well. The King did not rightly
know what it was all about when Holnstein requested an audience. He
said to me, ‘I observed to Holnstein, that I supposed he wished to see
Versailles.’ Of course, he (King William) could not have arranged that
himself”--(_i.e._, he could not have arranged to acquire the Imperial
dignity through the good offices of Bavaria.)
Werther, our Minister at Munich, seems to have reported that it was
intended there to commission Prince Luitpold with the proclamation of
the Emperor. The Chancellor observed: “A singular idea! Another example
of the way in which Bray treats matters of business. How is he to do
it? Step on to a balcony, and proclaim it?--to whom? That might do if
all the Princes were here--but with the three or four now present!
I had hoped that we should have made peace before German unity was
secured.”
Bohlen: “How pleased the King will feel at being made Emperor! and
still more so, the Crown Prince!”
The Chief: “Yes, and no doubt he is already thinking about the cut of
the Imperial robes.”
_Monday, December 5th._--The Chief sent for me, and gave me his
instructions for a _démenti_ with regard to the Bavarian Treaty,
in which his ideas were to be somewhat differently expressed. It
was to the following effect. The rumour that the Chancellor of the
Confederation only concluded the treaties with the South German States,
in anticipation that they would be rejected, or at least amended in
the Reichstag, is entirely without foundation. The debate on the
treaties must be brought to a close during the month of December, and
they must be adopted in their entirety, in order that they may come
into force on the 1st of January. Otherwise, everything will remain
uncertain. If the representatives of North Germany alter the treaties,
the South German Diets will be entitled to make further amendments in
a contrary sense, and there is no knowing how far that right might
not be exercised. In such circumstances, the nation might have still
to wait a long time for its political unity. (“Perhaps ten years,”
said the Chief, “and _interim aliquid fit_.”) In that case, also the
Treaty of Peace might not be what we desire. The treaties may be
deficient, but they can always be gradually improved by the Reichstag,
in co-operation with the Bundesrath, and through the pressure of public
opinion and national sentiment. There is no hurry about that. If public
opinion brings no pressure to bear in that direction, it is obvious
that the present arrangement meets the views of the majority of the
nation. Men of national sentiment at Versailles are very anxious and
uneasy at the prevailing dispositions in Berlin. They are, however,
to some extent reassured by the fact that the _Volkszeitung_ opposes
the Bavarian Treaty, as people have gradually grown accustomed to find
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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