In the afternoon wrote another article on the ever-increasing instances of French officers breaking their parole and absconding from the places where they were interned, and returning to France to take service against us again. Over fifty of these cases have occurred up to the present. They include officers of all ranks, and even three generals--namely, Ducrot, Cambriel, and Barral. After the battle of Sedan we could have rendered the army that was shut up in that fortress harmless by destroying it. Humanity, however, and faith in their pledged word induced us to forgo that measure. The capitulation was granted, and we were justified in considering that all the officers had agreed to its terms and were prepared to fulfil the conditions which it imposed. If that was not the case we ought to have been informed of the fact. We should then have treated those exceptions in an exceptional way, that is to say, not accorded to the officers in question the same treatment that was granted to the others. In other words, they would not have been allowed the liberty which they have now abused in such a disgraceful manner. It is true that the great majority of the captive officers have kept their word, and one might therefore have dismissed the matter with a shrug of the shoulders. But the affair assumes another aspect when the French Provisional Government approves this breach of their pledged word by reappointing such officers to the regiments that are opposing us in the field. Has there been a single case in which one of these deserters was refused readmission to the ranks of the French army? Or have any French officers protested against the readmission of such comrades into their corps? It is, therefore, not the Government alone, but also the officers of France, who consider this disgraceful conduct to be correct. The consequence, however, will be that the German Governments will feel bound in duty to consider whether the alleviation of their imprisonment hitherto accorded to French officers is consistent with the interests of Germany. And further, we must ask ourselves the question whether we shall be justified in placing confidence in any of the promises of the present French Government when it wants to treat with Germany, without material guarantees and pledges.