A war indemnity, however great it may be, would not compensate us for the enormous sacrifices we have made. We must protect South Germany with its exposed position against French attacks, and thus put an end to the pressure exercised upon it by France during two centuries, especially as this pressure has during the whole time greatly contributed to German disorganisation and confusion. Baden, Würtemberg, and the other south-western districts must not in future be threatened by Strassburg and subject to attack from that point. This also applies to Bavaria. Within 150 years the French have made war upon South-west Germany more than a dozen times. Efforts were made in 1814 and 1815 in a forbearing spirit to secure guarantees against a renewal of such attacks. That forbearance, however, was without effect, and it would now also remain fruitless. The danger lies in the incurable arrogance and lust of power which is part of the French character, qualities that might be abused by every ruler--not by any means by the Bonapartes alone--for the purpose of attacking peaceful neighbours. Our protection against this evil does not lie in vain attempts periodically to soothe French susceptibilities, but rather in securing a well-defended frontier. France, by repeatedly annexing German territory and all the natural defences on our western frontier, has put herself in a position to force her way into South Germany with a comparatively small force before assistance can be brought from the north. Such invasions have repeatedly occurred under Louis XIV. and his successor, as well as under the Republic and the First Empire, and the sense of insecurity obliges the German States to reckon constantly with France. That the annexation of a piece of territory will produce bitter feelings amongst the French is a matter of no consequence. Such feelings would exist in any case, even without any cession of territory. Austria did not lose an acre of soil in 1866, and yet what thanks have we had? Our victory at Sadowa had already filled the French with hatred and vexation. How much stronger must that sentiment be after our victories at Wörth and Metz! Revenge for those defeats will continue to be the war cry in Paris even without any annexation, and will spread to influential circles in the provinces, just as the idea of revenge for Waterloo was kept alive there for decades. An enemy who cannot be turned into a friend by considerate treatment must be rendered thoroughly and permanently harmless. Not the demolition, but the surrender, of the eastern fortresses of France can alone serve our purpose. Whoever desires disarmament must wish to see France’s neighbours adopt this course, as France is the sole disturber of European peace, and will remain so as long as she can.