“If the Parisian moral code culminates in the categorical imperative of revenge, the nation cannot be too strongly reminded how speedily the Germans could reach Paris from Reims, now that Metz, Strassburg, Verdun, and Toul no longer stand in their way. It would also be well if the various French Pretenders would bear in mind the position and treaty rights of Germany. The Government in office will in the circumstances save itself from disappointment by not counting upon any special consideration at the hands of Germany. It is entirely in the interest of peace that countries and peoples should know exactly how they stand with each other. The occupation of the French departments, conceded to us by treaty, is for us a defensive position from which we can only retire, in so far as we are obliged to do so by treaty, when we are perfectly satisfied respecting the sentiments and intentions of France. The policy and disposition of France since the conclusion of peace does not inspire that confidence which would justify us in renouncing any advantage of our present strong defensive position. In France a war of revenge is being incessantly preached from the house-tops, and a Government which has added to the military budget eighty to a hundred millions more than it reached under the Emperor Napoleon can lay no claim to a reputation for peacefulness. If France maintains that the war indemnity is excessive, and at the same displays lavish extravagance in preparing for another war, it may be fairly said that the despatch of the 7th instant, with its expression of regret that the German hopes for the re-establishment of more peaceful relations should have proved premature, was a moderately worded intimation, and that its publication was a well meant measure of precaution.”