_February 15th._--Among the documents which I read to-day I found one of last month that was of exceptional interest, as Bucher had added a number of marginal notes, obviously for the purposes of the Chief’s reply. It was a despatch from Arnim excusing himself to the Chancellor, who had charged him with giving utterance in his communications to opinions at variance with the fundamental principles of German policy. The Ambassador asserted that no divergency of views existed between them. The Prince had laid it down that the first task of Germany in connection with France was to prevent the latter being in a position to form alliances, and “he (Arnim) had also kept that end constantly in view.” It was only with respect to the means towards that end that he had expressed an opinion differing from the views of the Chief (who regards the maintenance of the Republic and of Thiers as the best course). The quotations from previous despatches show that there is as little truth in this statement as there was in the assertion that on his return to Paris in October last he had “found the President’s position strengthened to a greater degree than was desirable.” In reply to this assertion Bucher quotes the following sentences: “It is even now questionable whether Thiers, who imagines that he has come to terms with the agitator (Gambetta) is still a match for him” (Report of the 3rd of October), and “the continuance of the present _régime_ only benefits the Radical extremists, in whose programme the _revanche_ goes hand in hand with their campaign against the monarchies and the entire social system of Europe.” (Report of the 13th of November.) Finally, in his present defence, Arnim tries to show that he had formerly “observed, not without uneasiness, that Thiers was making arrangements intended to secure his own power for a number of years.” Thereupon the Chief had remarked: “He can hardly have observed that,” and Bucher quoted the following passage from a despatch of the Ambassador’s, dated the 30th of November: “The power which he is accumulating will pass into other hands (Gambetta’s).” Finally, the Count now asserts that he had only recommended “that M. Thiers’s prestige should no longer be promoted through the inspired German press.” In his report of the 29th of November the Ambassador persists in his opinion that “the President’s Government must be regarded as a source of serious anxiety for monarchical Europe.” In the despatch of the 30th of November Count Arnim recommends that we should bring about a crisis which should result in bringing either Gambetta to power or a Government which would seek support from Germany. We should then be justified in overthrowing Gambetta, and indeed obliged to do so (according to Arnim’s view of the case, on account of his propaganda). He would advise us to withdraw our support from Thiers. In conclusion, according to Bucher’s notes, Arnim says, in a report of the 6th of December: “It may be taken for granted