this sense to the French Government, and make it clear to them beyond all question that in those portions of the country which we occupy we shall recognise no alteration in the form, and no change in the principal holders of power, which does not arise out of the existing situation in the regular way, and in accordance with the laws now in force. We are giving evidence of the confidence which we repose in the present Government by rapidly reducing the German forces in the occupied districts. Should new movements in France force us to doubt the maintenance of the peace which has been concluded, your Excellency is aware that within fourteen days we could again put the same army in the field which we had in France last winter.” _June 11th._--Fabrice telegraphed the day before yesterday to the Chief stating, _inter alia_, that the rapid withdrawal of our troops outside Paris and elsewhere before the payment of the first half milliard was obviously exercising an influence upon the temper and behaviour of the population, whose attitude would grow more and more confident, if not hostile, as the evacuation proceeded. Washburne had confidently advised prudence, and in speaking to Holstein had described the sentiments of the Parisians towards the Germans as doubtful, adding that the Government lacked the power, and perhaps the will, to counteract this tendency, and that the protection of the Germans in Paris depended solely upon the German garrisons still in the neighbourhood. No reliance could be placed upon the future development of affairs in France. The first two milliards would be paid in order to give Germany a sense of security. The balance of three milliards, however, would not be paid--as had been openly stated by personages in authority, not soldiers--while, on the other hand, there was a determination to recover the ceded territories. The Chief thereupon telegraphed to the Saxon General yesterday that neither were we bound nor did we intend to reduce the zone of occupation, and that we should certainly not evacuate the forts before the date specified in the Treaty of Frankfurt. If we reduced the number of our troops in the occupied districts, it was not that we trusted France, but only that we had confidence in our own rapidity of mobilisation. It was possible that the French would not carry out the treaty of peace in full, and even that they intended to attack us, but as soon as the mobilisation of the French forces rendered the latter eventuality probable, or if there were a wilful delay in the payments to be made, a force of 600,000 could, within a fortnight, be put into the field between Metz and Paris. He, Fabrice, should permit no doubt to exist upon this point. It was cheaper to strengthen our forces outside Paris as required than to leave them there for an indefinite period. There was no disposition to conceal the possibility of a renewal of the war, but on the other hand such a renewal was not feared.