A report addressed to the Chief from Paris on the 7th of December contains the following particulars respecting Beust’s visit and the French _revanche_ idea:--“Count Beust called upon me on his way to London, having first had an interview with M. Thiers. His impression of the Government here was that, even in foreign affairs, it was not so judicious as was generally believed. I did not conceal from the Count the view which I have already expressed to your Serene Highness, namely, that the President of the Republic wishes, above everything else, to avoid all foreign complications. Count Beust, with whom M. Thiers seems to have talked a great deal of hypothetical politics, maintains his opinion that at Versailles there was too much disposition to seek out all sorts of complications. I refrain for the moment from commenting upon this statement, which was obviously made with a purpose. I have to-day received a communication of a similar kind from a French source, that is to say, from the Vicomte de Calonne, who formerly served our interests, though with little success. He is doubtless in possession of a great deal of information with which I am not yet acquainted. Possibly his present move is intended to reopen the old relations. The Vicomte asserts that Thiers has one idea which governs his whole policy, namely, that of _la revanche_. Although he may not show it, it is firmly rooted in his mind. M. Thiers has inaugurated--not unskilfully--a press campaign which is to keep the _revanche_ idea alive. I do not deny that, from my own observations made some days before I had seen M. Calonne, a distinction should be drawn between the utterances of the President and the language of his journals. While M. Thiers and M. Casimir Perier expressed themselves grateful for the recognition of their loyalty contained in Herr Delbrück’s speech, the official papers assumed an offended air, and journals apparently of a more independent character, but also possibly influenced from Versailles, represented the Minister’s speech as a proof that Germany had not ceased her provocations to war. To this extent M. de Calonne’s communication is in harmony with other indications. He, however, somewhat diminished the value of his information by disclosing himself as a voluntary agent of the Legitimists. He expressed a wish that we should give the latter our moral support, as without a restoration neither peace nor order could be reckoned upon in France. I was able to point out to M. de Calonne that, next to the Bonapartist journals, the Legitimist press was the most violent in its crusade against Germany, and that the restoration of internal order was France’s own affair. Our interest in the matter was purely selfish, the only consideration for us being how best to _tirer notre épingle du jeu_. He could, therefore, see for himself what was our attitude towards internal questions, which, moreover, were still very unripe. M. de Calonne was not very pleased with these