He has always the right to raise as many soldiers as he considers necessary, and of course the expense thus incurred must be voted.--But what I wanted to say to you is this. I have used reassuring language in the Reichstag with regard to the present attitude of Russia towards us. But many considerations had to be passed over in silence to which it would not have served my purpose to give utterance, but which may be indicated in the press--cautiously. There, I was speaking not only to the members of the Reichstag and the German public, but also to foreign countries, and to a particular quarter where I wished to let it be seen that I trusted to their insight, good will and love of peace, and where such confidence is appreciated--the Emperor Alexander--especially when it comes from a quarter in which he himself may and really does repose unlimited confidence. That is quite true. The Emperor and Giers now anticipate no danger for Russia from Germany, and consequently do not think of attacking us; and so far as the immediate future is concerned they will in all probability not adopt a hostile attitude towards us, if things remain as they now are in Germany and Russia. At the same time a change may occur in the situation. There is, in addition to the Emperor, a kind of public opinion, parties that must be reckoned with even now, and which in a war between Germany and France would exercise all the greater influence on the decisions of the Crown, in that their views and demands would appear to coincide with the real interests of Russia. There you have the pan-Slavists, with their hatred of the Germans and their leaning towards France. And then there are the Poles and the Liberal Russians, who desire a war with us in the hope that it would result in the defeat of Russia and secure their ultimate aim, namely, independence for the Poles and a Constitution for the others. In case of a conflict between Germany and France, these parties would exert a stronger pressure in exalted regions than they have ever been able to do up to the present, through their newspapers, and their allies in the army, in the Ministries, and in Court circles. Even the possibility of their efforts ultimately affecting the judgment and love of peace prevailing there--as did actually occur under the late Emperor, before the last Russo-Turkish war--would force us to send an army of observation of at least 100,000 men to our eastern frontier to watch the 200,000 soldiers stationed by Russia in her western provinces, thus considerably weakening our available forces against France. Moreover, supposing that, in spite of this, we were victorious, public opinion in St. Petersburg and Moscow, and ultimately the Government under its pressure, would scarcely suffer us to turn our victory to sufficiently good account in order to thoroughly weaken France for the next thirty or forty years, as that would be a strengthening of the German Empire which might arouse serious apprehension in Russia.