Letter from the King to Bismarck, dated Baden-Baden, October 2nd, 1879: “I regret to see from your letter of the 24th ultimo, as also from the memorandum enclosed therewith, from the protocols of your negotiations in Vienna, and from the draft treaty which has been based upon them, that my views with regard to the latter have not found acceptance on any side. As I expressed these views in my letters from Danzig and Stettin of the 10th and 12th ultimo as clearly as it was possible for me to do, you can see for yourself how far they differ from the results arrived at, so that there is no necessity for me to repeat them. Notwithstanding this circumstance, however, I return herewith your letter of the 24th in order that you may form an idea from my marginal notes (which, I regret to say, are only in pencil) of the impression which it has made upon me. “Germany and Austria are desirous of attaining the same end--security against unprovoked attacks by foreign foes. But owing to the special mention of Russia as the foe in question, I cannot agree to the present proposals nor to the immediate conclusion of a treaty. After again extending the hand in friendship to the Emperor Alexander after the removal of misunderstandings (at Alexandrowo), am I now to conclude an alliance against him, even of a defensive character, in which he alone is referred to as the presumable aggressor, and keep this intention a secret from him? I cannot be guilty of such an act of disloyalty. In mitigation of this objection it has been urged that, _le cas échéant_, Russia would be informed of the existence of an alliance, if indications of a war against us became evident. This very uncertain expression is so elastic that the notice would either come too late or would only cause still greater irritation. It was further argued that in the state of ferment now prevailing in the internal affairs of Russia the knowledge of the alliance in question would give her the leverage and self-command necessary to master that ferment. But surely for that purpose official knowledge of that honourable intention is necessary. And yet it is of course impossible to give official knowledge of the fact that Russia is regarded as the sole enemy. Therefore in order that it may be possible to communicate the treaty to Russia, the reference to her must be omitted from it, and the enemy be only described in general terms, while it must be incidentally mentioned that in entering upon it the parties have this honourable intention in view. That is what I desire. I am opposed to an immediate ratification of the treaty, because there is at the present moment absolutely nothing which could lead to a war against Germany and Austria, and it is notorious that binding treaties entered into without urgent necessity are double-edged weapons. Austria urges the immediate ratification on the ground that the favourable situation which for the moment exists