“This would render necessary a modification of section 1; section 2 would drop out entirely; section 4 would be redrafted in accordance with my marginal notes, should it be considered desirable that the draft itself should constitute the first invitation to Russia to join in the treaty, as the whole treaty would be submitted as an instrument affecting so far only Germany and Austria. I consider the omission of section 2 to be necessary, because it is directed exclusively against Russia; and furthermore because it is specially stated in your letter of the 24th ultimo that in case of an attack by France upon Germany, Austria would be dispensed from supporting the latter, and only bound to observe a benevolent neutrality. That is as much as to say that we should support Austria against Russia with our whole power (section 1), while Austria is dispensed from rendering a like service if France should attack us. But the latter eventuality is unquestionably more possible and indeed more probable than a Russian attack, at least up to the present, since there the desire for the _revanche_ is only slumbering, has never been abandoned, and will show itself again directly a suitable opportunity arises. With regard to our--Germany’s--position in a war with France I differ from Field-Marshal Moltke, inasmuch as I cannot endorse his view that our forces are sufficient to enable us to carry on such a war without allies. In that event we should find ourselves in presence of an army entirely different to that of 1870, as the progress which it has made is undeniable. Besides, there is a further consideration, namely, the almost hermetically sealed French frontier, extending from the Swiss to the Belgian frontiers, a continuous line of fortresses and forts, which--even if broken through--would render it impossible to send reinforcements to the front, and would, moreover, enormously hamper the strategic advance of our forces. It is on this restricted field that, according to Field-Marshal Moltke, we are to deliver battle. If we are victorious we cannot pursue the defeated enemy as we did in 1870, being stopped by this girdle of fortresses, to which, instead of engaging in a pursuit, we should immediately have to lay siege. Months might pass before we could capture any of them, and this would give the defeated army time to refit at its leisure behind this line and to meet us well prepared in the event of our breaking through it at the risk of our communications with our base. But if the German army is defeated in the first battle then the left bank of the Rhine is immediately lost and we must withdraw across the river. “For this reason Austria ought not to remain neutral in such a war, but, on the contrary, must be bound by treaty to support us with her whole power, in the same way as the treaty binds us to do with regard to Russia.”