My strength for work is no longer equal to my will, but up to my last breath the latter shall be devoted to your Majesty. “von Bismarck.” The letter from Frederick William IV. was also published, in No. 13, and all were reproduced by numerous other papers. I insert here, first the remaining letters from Bismarck to William I. which I copied at his desire, and then some of the more important papers in the new batch. FURTHER LETTERS FROM BISMARCK TO EMPEROR WILLIAM I. 4. “Varzin, _August 13, 1875_. “I have received with respectful thanks your Majesty’s gracious letter of the 8th instant, and am pleased above all things to see that the cure has agreed with your Majesty in spite of the run of bad weather in the Alps. With respect to the letter from Queen Victoria I have the honour to add again that it would have been very interesting if her Majesty had expressed herself more fully as to the origin of the rumours of war circulated at that time. The sources must have been regarded as very trustworthy by that exalted lady, as otherwise her Majesty would not have again referred to them, and the English Government would also not have taken in connection with them measures of such an important character and such an unfriendly nature towards us. I do not know whether your Majesty considers it possible to take Queen Victoria at her word when her Majesty asserts that ‘it is an easy matter for her to prove that her apprehensions were not exaggerated.’ It would also be doubtless of importance to ascertain from what quarter such ‘serious errors’ could have been despatched to Windsor. The hints as to persons who must be regarded as ‘representatives’ of your Majesty’s Government would appear to refer to Count Münster. He, like Count Moltke, may very well have spoken academically of the usefulness of a timely attack upon France, although I do not know that he has, and he was never instructed to do so. It may indeed be said that it is not calculated to promote the maintenance of peace for France to have the assurance that she will never be attacked under _any_ circumstances, do what she may. Now, as in 1867 in the Luxemburg question, I would never advise your Majesty to begin hostilities at once, merely because it was probable that the enemy would shortly enter upon them. One can never foresee the ways of Providence with sufficient clearness to do that. But it is also of no use to give the opponent the _assurance_ that one will wait for his attack _under all circumstances_. I should therefore not blame Münster if he had spoken in that sense occasionally, and the English Government would have no right to take official steps upon non-official remarks of our Ambassador, and, _sans vous dire gare_, to invite the other Powers to bring pressure to bear. Such a serious and unfriendly course of action gives reason to suspect