However the experienced philosopher may be convinced that _in
themselves_ theories are nothing--that they are but collations of
phenomena under a generic formula, which is useful only inasmuch as it
groups these phenomena; yet it is difficult to see how, without these
imperfect generalizations, any mind can retain the endless variety of
facts and relations which every branch of science presents; still
less, how these can be taught, learned, reasoned upon, or used. How
could the facts of geology be recollected, or how, indeed, could they
constitute a science without reference to some real or supposed bond
of union, some aqueous or igneous theory? How could two chemists
converse on chemistry without the use of the term affinity, and the
theoretical conception it involves? How could a name be applied, or a
nomenclature adopted, without that imperfect, or more or less perfect
grouping of facts, which involves theory? As far as we can recollect,
all the alterations of nomenclature which have been introduced, or
attempted, proceed upon some alteration of theory.
If not theory but hypothesis be objected to--not the imperfect
generalization of phenomena, but a gratuitous assumption for the sake
of collating them, this, although ground which should be trodden more
cautiously, appears in certain cases unavoidable; in fact, is scarcely
separable from theory. Had men not "lectured learnedly" about the two
_fluids_ of electricity, we should not now possess many of the
discoveries with which this science is enriched, although we do not,
and probably never shall, know what electricity is.
On the other hand, among professed physical philosophers, the great
abuse of theories and hypotheses is, that their promulgators soon
regard them, not as aids to science, to be changed if occasion should
require, but as absolute natural truths; they look to that as an end,
which is in fact but a means; their theories become part of their
mental constitution, idiosyncrasies; and they themselves become
partizans of a faction, and cease to be inductive philosophers.
Another injury to science, in a great measure peculiar to the present
day, arises from the number of speculations which are ushered into the
world to account for the same phenomena; every one, like Sir Andrew
Aguecheek, when he wished to cudgel a Puritan, has for his opinion "no
exquisite reasons, but reasons good enough." In the periods of science
immediately subsequent to the time of Bacon, men commenced their
career by successful experiment; and having convinced the world of
their aptitude for perceiving the relations of natural phenomena,
enounced theories which they believed the most efficient to give a
comprehensive generality to the whole. Men now, however, commence with
theories, though, alas! the converse does not hold good--they do not
always end with experiment.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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