The opening address of the Attorney-General was temperate, clear, and able; most faithfully stating the law which he charged Lord Cardigan with having violated, and the facts constituting the violation. He reminded the House that sixty-four years had elapsed since a similar trial had taken place--that of Lord Byron, for killing his opponent in a duel. "I am rejoiced, my Lords, to think," continued the Attorney-General, in terms which immediately occasioned great observation, "that the charge against the noble prisoner at the bar _does not imply any degree of moral turpitude_; and that, if he should be found guilty, the conviction will reflect no discredit upon the illustrious order to which he belongs. But, my Lords, it seems to me that he has been clearly guilty of a breach of the statute law of the realm, which this and all other courts of justice are bound to respect and enforce. Your lordships are not sitting here as a court of honour, or as a branch of the legislature, but as a court of justice, bound by the rules of law, and under a sanction as sacred as that of an oath.... Your lordships are aware that the noble Earl is in the army--Lieutenant-colonel of the 11th Hussars; and I have no doubt that, on this occasion, he only complied with what he thought necessary to the usages of society. But, under these circumstances, though it would have been considered, if death had ensued, _a great calamity, and not a great crime_--though moralists of the highest authority have defended duelling--it remains for your lordships to consider what duelling is by the law of England." After quoting from the known great authorities, Hale, Hawkins, Foster, and Blackstone, proving that a death by duelling was wilful murder, the Attorney-General correctly observed--"It necessarily follows, from this definition of murder, that the _first count_ of the indictment is [that is, he expected that it would be] completely proved. The only supposition, my Lords, by which the case can be reduced to one of _manslaughter_ would be, that Lord Cardigan and Captain Tuckett _casually_ met at Wimbledon Common--that they _suddenly_ quarrelled--and that, while their blood was up, they fought. But your lordships can hardly strain the facts so far as to suppose that this was a casual meeting, when you find that each was supplied with his second--that each had a brace of pistols--and that the whole affair was conducted according to the forms and solemnities observed when a deliberate duel is fought." Could anything be more clear and cogent? "Then, my Lords, with regard to the second and third counts of the indictment, I know not what defence can possibly be suggested; because, even if there had been this casual meeting, contrary to all probability and all the circumstances of the case--if it would only, had death ensued, have amounted to the crime of manslaughter--that would be no defence to the second and third counts of the indictment,