That there is room for certain changes in the national representation we are by no means disposed to deny. It is impossible to devise any system so perfect as to preclude the idea of amendment; indeed, we suppose that there never was a constitution, or phase of a constitution, in the world, which gave entire and perfect satisfaction to all who lived under its operation. We may be told that the present system is theoretically wrong, that its principle is to exalt property and to exclude intelligence, and that in some parts it is incongruous, inconsistent, and contradictory. Possibly there may be some truth in such allegations; but then we must never lose sight of this, that the real test of a constitution is its practical working. It is undeniable that under the present system the middle classes have gained, not only power, but preponderance in the state; and accordingly we find that they are not favourable to a change which would certainly operate to their disadvantage. The ulterior aims of the men of Manchester may prompt them to desire a still further infusion of the democratic element, but neither the members nor the doctrines of that school have found favour with the British public. If public opinion generally, and the great interests of the nation, are well and effectively represented in the House of Commons, it does seem to us a very perilous experiment to disturb that state of matters. We should like very much to hear from Lord John Russell a distinct exposition of the results which he anticipates, should this scheme of his be carried. Is there any real point of interest to the nation which he is at present debarred from bringing forward by the exclusive constitution of the House of Commons? What are the existing grievances which call for so radical an alteration? “What is there now amiss That Cæsar and his senate must redress?” We apprehend that the noble lord would be greatly puzzled to frame an intelligible answer to such queries. Well then, we are, perforce, compelled to fall back upon theory, and to assume that he vindicates his proposal, not because future measures will be of a better kind, or better discussed than heretofore, but because it is desirable, for symmetry’s sake, that the representation should be readjusted. Be it so. We are content to take that view, albeit a low one, and to examine his scheme without any partial leaning to the present constitution of the House of Commons. And first, let us see what regard he has paid to the principle of equal representation.