Foresight, moderation, and firmness are, as we have observed, the characteristics of French policy in the Eastern question. In these despatches we see the French minister anticipate the moment when negotiation would become fruitless, and when all honourable mode of arrangement would be rejected by Russia. In its earlier stages we find the French ambassador in London, earnestly and repeatedly urged to come to an understanding with the English Cabinet on the conduct which, in such an emergency, it would be necessary to adopt. It is to the repeated instances of M. Drouyn de Lhuys we owe it, that identical instructions were given to M. de Lacour and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, which directed that the fleets should enter the Dardanelles if the Russians did not evacuate the Principalities which they had invaded. Yet the fatal hesitation of Lord Aberdeen may be traced even in the resolves of the French minister. In the decided measure adopted by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, there appeared an unwillingness to break off rudely with Russia. In his despatch of the 1st September, that minister informs Count Walewski, that the presence of the fleets at the entrance of the Dardanelles—_outside the castles_—if demanded by the Porte—was rather a measure of precaution against the weather, than an encouragement to the Porte in its refusal to the reasonable demands of Russia. It may be that such a declaration was with a view to allay any alarm which might be felt by the German states at the onward movement of the fleet. We find additional evidence of the unwillingness to occasion fresh embarrassment in the cause assigned for the first appearance of a detachment of the squadron before Constantinople. That pretext was the apprehension of insurrection against the Sultan by the _Ulemas_, and the massacre of the Christian population. We have no doubt that there was considerable dissatisfaction manifested by the Turks at the delays of their _soi-disant_ allies; and that there existed much irritation at the conduct of the western Courts, who had advised the Porte to resist the demands of Russia; excited it to use all the means at its disposal to maintain that resistance; and who, when Turkey was left exposed to the wrath of her formidable enemy, still lingered at the mouth of the Dardanelles. But we look in vain for satisfactory proofs of the plots of insurrection and massacre attributed to the Mussulman population, and assigned as the cause of the presence of the fleets at Constantinople. We regard the whole thing as one of those paltry subterfuges, of which we find so many instances throughout this proceeding. Nothing was, however, gained by it; and neither the Emperor of Russia nor the public was deceived. The Christian population of Stamboul showed no sign of apprehension, and we have reason to believe that they disclaimed, so far as they were concerned, any such motive. The Turks were offended at being accused of a crime which they had not contemplated, and outraged