The absorbing interest which attached to events in western Europe since the revolution of 1848—the revolution which had convulsed nearly every Continental state—had occupied the public mind to the exclusion of everything else; and Russia availed herself of the storm which raged everywhere, except in her own territory, to realise her aggressive projects. Her political and religious influence had long been paramount at Constantinople. The arrival of M. de Lavalette first threatened to disturb that monopoly. Indeed, any allusion, however slight, to the capitulation of 1741, instantly alarmed Russia; and Prince Menschikoff, finding that the secret of the Czar was discovered, hastened to present his ultimatum, with all the aggravating and insulting circumstances already known. The French Government explained at length to the Cabinet of St Petersburg the motives and the extent of the French demands with reference to the Holy Places; but the Head of the Orthodox Church refused to listen—he would bear no rival in the East. “There is established,” said M. Drouyn de Lhuys in his despatch of the 21st March to General Castelbajac, “an important political usage in Europe. It consists in this, that the Powers interest themselves in common in certain general interests, and overcome, by means of their diplomacy, difficulties which at another period could only be terminated by force of arms. Be so good, then, General, as to demand of M. de Nesselrode if the Cabinet of St Petersburg, repudiating the principle which has prevailed for thirty years in the relations of the great Powers with each other, means to constitute itself the sole arbiter of the destinies of Turkey, and if for that common policy, to which the world is indebted for its repose, Russia means to substitute a policy of isolation and domination which would necessarily constrain the other Cabinets in the approaching crisis to consult only their own interests, and to act only with a view to their private views.” Russia did not choose to comprehend the full significance of that intimation; and though she herself had often been among the first to solicit a European combination when there appeared a chance of her deriving advantage from it, she yet haughtily rejected the proposal when it crossed, or did not promote, her ambition. Her great object was to treat with Turkey _without the intervention of a third party_; and it was the arrogant manner in which she met the advances of the Western Powers, or rather forbade them to meddle in what she regarded as a domestic quarrel between a vassal and his master, that attracted general attention to the question, and gave it a European character. We find no point more strongly insisted on by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in his despatches to General Castelbajac, than not permitting Russia to assume this exclusive right of dictating her will on the Oriental question. It is superfluous to say that France had no intention