under the protection of all alike; whilst the Greek protectorate was of the most exclusive character, and, as has been shown in a previous article, was not religious, but political, and aimed at placing the whole Ottoman Empire at the feet of Russia. Another point which M. Drouyn de Lhuys has handled successfully, is that which relates to the difference in the measures adopted in common by France and England, when affairs reached a most alarming point, and those which Russia, in the impatience of her ambition, adopted, at the very outset. In the despatch of the 11th June, General Castelbajac is enjoined to apprise the Russian Government of the position in which it was about to place itself with respect to the rest of Europe; to warn it that it was grievously mistaken if it counted upon allies in the realisation of its designs, and particularly upon the German states. Indeed, it was not probable that these states would see with indifference the Lower Danube in the possession of a powerful government, which might at will obstruct its navigation, and at any moment block up a commercial outlet of so much importance. The French Minister clearly showed that the conduct of Russia was in opposition to the general interests of Europe; and that the realisation of the doctrines of the Russian Chancellor meant, in point of fact, the subjugation of the weaker states to the will of one great power. The replies of M. de Nesselrode are, of course, replete with the same pacific declarations which had produced so soporific an effect on our own Government, and with solemn denials of ambitious views, which present a curious contrast with the warlike preparations which were never for a moment suspended except by difficulties independent of the will of Russia. It was soon seen that, _coûte qui coûte_, Russia was determined not to give way. Smooth and hypocritical, like a thief at the bar, who profits by the scantiness of the evidence at first brought against him, earnestly to protest his innocence, she became bold, insolent, and defying, like the same culprit when accumulated proofs leave no doubt of his guilt. There are some despatches that have not been inserted in the _Moniteur_, but we have little doubt that the omitted ones are not less moderate, less firm, and not less characterised by good sense and dignity, than those we have noticed; and if any such doubt existed, the ultimatum, which was at once followed by a complete rupture of diplomatic relations, would suffice to remove it. Towards the close of December all was over. The massacre of Sinope had taken place, and no further hope remained of obtaining any satisfactory result from a power which, in its diplomacy as its hostility, appeared to have all at once lost every sentiment of truth, justice, and humanity. The autograph letter of the Emperor Napoleon is little more than a summary of the despatch of the 25th December, of the notes addressed to M. de Kisseleff before his departure from Paris, and of the