“Supposing my suspicion to be well founded, the Emperor’s object is to engage Her Majesty’s Government, in conjunction with his own Cabinet and that of Vienna, in some scheme for the ultimate partition of Turkey, and for the exclusion of France from the arrangement.” On the following day a more particular, and, if possible, more interesting, conversation took place between the Czar and the British envoy. We regret extremely that our limits will not allow us to detail this so fully as we could wish, but we shall advert to the principal points, which were in the form of a commentary upon Lord John Russell’s despatch. The Emperor began by saying,— “That he was, perhaps, even more interested than England could be in preventing a Turkish catastrophe, but that it was constantly impending; that it might be brought about at any moment, either by an external war, or by a feud between the old Turkish party and that of the ‘new superficial French reforms,’ or again, by a rising of the Christians, already known to be very impatient of shaking off the Mussulman yoke. As regards the first cause, the Emperor said that he had a good right to advert to it, inasmuch as, if he had not stopped the victorious progress of General Diebitch in 1829, the Sultan’s authority would have been at an end.” Next he descanted upon what could _not_ be permitted in the event of a break-up of the Ottoman empire. This is perhaps the most curious passage of the whole. “‘Well, there are several things which I never will tolerate; I will begin by ourselves. I will not tolerate _the permanent occupation_ of Constantinople by the Russians; having said this, I will say that it never shall be held by the English, or French, or any other great nation. Again, I never will permit an attempt at the reconstruction of a Byzantine empire, or such an extension of Greece as would render her a powerful state; still less will I permit the breaking up of Turkey into little republics, asylums for the Kossuths and Mazzinis, and other revolutionists of Europe; rather than submit any of these arrangements I would go to war, and as long as I have a man and a musket left would carry it on. These,’ the Emperor said, ‘are at once some ideas; now give me some in return.’” This was an awkward demand, but Sir H. Seymour seems to have acquitted himself with sufficient adroitness. He put the following case: “How would it be if, in the event of any catastrophe occurring in Turkey, Russia and England were to declare that no Power should be allowed to take possession of its provinces; that the property should remain, as it were, under seals, until amicable arrangements could be made as to its adjudication?” Of course this notion could not be countenanced; and the Emperor’s reply allowed Sir Hamilton the opportunity of making the following remark:—