“In short, the Emperor cannot but congratulate himself at having given occasion for this intimate interchange of confidential communications between Her Majesty and himself. He has found therein valuable assurances, of which he takes note with a lively satisfaction. The two Sovereigns have frankly explained to each other, what in the extreme case of which they have been treating, their respective interests cannot endure. England understands that Russia cannot suffer the establishment at Constantinople of a Christian Power sufficiently strong to control and disquiet her. She declares, that for herself she renounces any intention or desire to possess Constantinople. The Emperor equally disclaims any wish or design of establishing himself there. England promises that she will enter into no arrangement for determining the measures to be taken in the event of the fall of the Turkish empire, without a previous understanding with the Emperor. The Emperor, on his side, willingly contracts the same engagement. As he is aware that in such a case he can equally reckon upon Austria, who is bound by her promises to concert with him, he regards with less apprehension the catastrophe which he still desires to prevent, and avert as much as it shall depend on him to do so.” This is, perhaps, the most extraordinary note that was ever issued. If founded upon nothing else than Lord John Russell’s single despatch of 9th February 1853, it is an attempt to make a memorandum supply the place of a treaty, and that not with regard to existing circumstances, but to a contingency involving the destruction of an ally. The Emperor must, indeed, have had great faith in the subserviency of the British Cabinet to his views, before he could have ventured on such a step. Lord Clarendon now comes into action, as the successor of Lord John Russell in the Home Office; but we need not pursue the correspondence further than to say, that it was conducted on the same principle of remonstrance, though very feeble on the part of the British Minister, against the assumption that Turkey was absolutely in a critical state, and of assertion to the contrary on the part of the Czar. His object was to alienate Britain from France—to keep the latter power out of any arrangement which might be made for the partition of the Turkish territories—and to hasten the crisis as fast as possible, in order that Britain might be compelled to come to definite terms. Lord Clarendon’s despatches are couched in terms quite unworthy of his position. Lord John Russell, who had primarily to state the views of the British Cabinet, may be excused for a certain weakness of expression; but no such apology can be made for Lord Clarendon, who was bound emphatically to have informed the Czar that this country disdained his proposals, and was prepared, at any hazard, to maintain the integrity of Turkey. We say that he was bound to have done so, on the supposition that the Aberdeen