In order thoroughly to appreciate these considerations, it would be necessary to dissect the whole extended frontier of the empire, and consider generally:—The political combinations which have in every case led to the annexation of each individual province—the advantage secured to Russia by such annexation—the present internal condition of the conquered province—the reasons which render any further extension of the frontier line in the same direction undesirable—and also to what country in Europe these reasons are more especially applicable—finally, with reference to the war now impending, the comparative strength or weakness of the advanced posts, and their general merits as points of attack. In making this survey the most eastern limit to which Russian influence extends forms the natural starting-point, and, as we explore the sands of Tartary, we shall soon discover that they possess at least far higher claims upon the notice of the British public than the snows of Lapland. At the same time, the information which we possess upon this remote quarter of the globe is so meagre as to render any very full account of the Kirghiz Steppes and their inhabitants impossible—and the historical records are so uncertain as to make it somewhat difficult to follow every step of the process by which Russia gradually exerted her influence over those nomadic hordes who wander between China and the Caspian, between Siberia and Khiva. Nor would there be much use in pursuing the inquiry, did it not derive its interest from the extreme anxiety Russia has manifested for a century past to advance and consolidate her power in this direction—incurring vast expense and sparing no efforts to carry out the apparently insane project of subduing two millions of the most impracticable savages that ever defied civilisation, and annexing a more uninhabitable series of deserts than are to be found in the whole continent of Asia. It is not to be wondered at, if an attempt so long and earnestly persisted in, and apparently so little in accordance with the sagacity which usually characterises Muscovite diplomacy, should attract attention, more especially since the motives ostensibly assigned by Russia are by no means sufficient to account for her course of procedure. The necessity of protecting and encouraging her Eastern trade has been put very prominently forward as the principal ground of interference with independent barbarians; and, in so far as her commercial intercourse with Khiva and Boukhara are likely to promote her ulterior designs, this is doubtless the case. The trade of the East once passed through the Caucasian provinces; but when those provinces fell into the hands of Russia, it was diverted into another channel by the establishment of a restrictive system which proved that the encouragement of commerce was merely the pretext used to acquire a territory, the prosperity of which was a matter of indifference to the government. Had the same energies been expended in