It is very evident, that only by the reascendancy of the Conservative party can these blessings be secured to the country. The tradition of that party is, as its name implies, the preservation of our institutions in Church and State. This is a definite object. That it is a desirable one, is a conclusion which is arrived at by one course of reasoning, the same premises, the same logical inferences. Hence the Conservative party is a united band. A Conservative Minister cannot be a Minister on sufferance; a Whig Minister must. The Whigs are ever desirous of change, and the so-called amelioration of our institutions; but few of them agree together in the paramount importance which attaches to the reform of any particular abuse, or in the amount of innovation which it is desirable to introduce. Hence they are always at variance with each other when the time for action arrives; and this incapacitates them for carrying on the Queen’s government. If popular enthusiasm comes to their aid, and force them on in spite of themselves, then the case is different. The Reform Bill of 1832 was carried triumphantly, but by the people. Popular enthusiasm supplied vigour to the executive. Contrast this with another Reform Bill, of no very distant date, as regards its introduction at least, though few of the present generation are likely to see that bill become the law of the land. The time was unfortunate for Whig administrators, though backed by those who claim to themselves the name of Conservatives. A Russian war carried that enthusiasm, so necessary to the Whigs, through another channel, and exposed in a ludicrous manner the true value of a Liberal Administration, and their dependence upon the popular will. True, there was a large party in the Senate clamorous for reform—perhaps a majority. There was no hesitation amongst members to conclude that reform was necessary, for these are liberal times. How, then, do we account for their ill-success? By adopting a happy description of their worth as statesmen, given long ago: “Their head is at fever heat, but their hand is paralysed.” They are not slow to adopt as their own any principle, though calculated to throw the country in a flame, so long as it is traditionally the property of their party. But when the time for action arrives, when that principle is to be embodied in a bill, and that theory is to be reduced to a practical test, then comes division and discontent. One portion objects to this part as too sweeping, while another declares it to be too confined. This wants one remedy, the other declares the wished-for remedy will only prove an aggravation of the malady. There is no hesitation in adopting any principle, however dangerous. Give them the opportunity—the advantageous opportunity, in the eyes of politicians—of putting their plans into execution, and immediately we behold irresolution, consequent upon dissension, and inactivity, the offspring of indecision.