The infantry now in Cuba is about twenty thousand strong, well disciplined, in good condition, and accustomed to the climate. Were these forces, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, concentrated in the field against the American pirates, it is difficult to believe that the latter could succeed in getting together, or at least in landing, a force capable of resisting their attack. To speak positively on this point, however, it would be necessary to be somewhat in the confidence of the _filibusteros_, or at least to know more than is positively known of their resources, plans, and places of rendezvous. But even supposing that they muster more than we, in our imperfect information, think probable, it is to be borne in mind that the very best irregular troops, however formidable their valour and skill with their weapons may render them in small numbers, are far less to be feared when they act in large masses. Then the deficiency in discipline and drill tells heavily against them. I am far from underrating the indomitable pluck of the Americans, or their coolness or steadiness when in peril, and only desire to see those valuable qualities displayed in a better cause than the one to which we are assured they are shortly to be devoted. But in an open plain, or in the attack of a fortress, and when opposed to regular troops of average bravery, something more than pluck and coolness is required. Upon the other hand, it must not be forgotten, when we seek to strike the balance of chances, that the garrison of Cuba could not be brought entire into the field. Certain forts, and towns, and positions must be held, and although it is probable that many of these would be left to the keeping of the numerous volunteers that would take up arms the moment an invasion occurred, still portions of the garrison must be detached from the main body. An intelligent Spaniard, who has spent several years in Cuba, and but recently returned thence, gave it me as his opinion that from ten to twelve thousand men could be employed as the army of operation. He estimated the present garrison at rather under twenty thousand men effective for the field, which is somewhat less than the government estimate. The European Spaniards in the island he believed to be about fifty thousand, a large proportion Basques and Catalans, and who would readily enrol themselves as volunteers in case of peril, would prove formidable antagonists, and fight desperately for their homes and property. As to the native Cubans, many of them would be likely to join the Americans, if these were strong, and gained advantages at first starting; but if the invaders were worsted, the Cubans would fly to arms and vaunt their fidelity to Spain. The negroes, who have no wish to exchange Spanish for American masters, and who are aware of the many disadvantages under which even a free man of colour labours in the States, would all be ready to fight, if arms were given to them. The negro mode of fighting, as described to