In ancient Rome, as at one time in Modern Athens, there was a practice of throwing or emptying things out of window not without danger or damage to the passer-by. This was the law on that point:— “If anything was thrown from the windows of a house near a public thoroughfare, so as to injure any one by its fall, the inhabitant or occupier was, by the Roman law, bound to repair the damage, though it might be done without his knowledge by his family or servants, or even by a stranger. This affords an illustration of liability arising _quasi ex delicto_. “In like manner, when damage was done to any person by a slave or an animal, the owner might in certain circumstances be liable for the loss, though the mischief was done without his knowledge and against his will; but in such a case, if no fault was directly imputable to the owner, he was entitled to free himself from all responsibility by abandoning the offending slave or animal to the person injured, which was called _noxæ dare_. Though these noxal actions are not classed by Justinian under the title of obligations _quasi ex delicto_, yet, in principle, they evidently fall within that category. “All animals _feræ naturæ_, such as lions, tigers, bears, and the like, must be kept in a secure place to prevent them from doing mischief; but the same vigilance is not required in the case of animals _mansuetæ naturæ_, the presumption being, that no harm will arise in leaving them at large, unless they are known to be vicious or dangerous. So, where a foxhound destroyed eighteen sheep belonging to a farmer, it was decided by the House of Lords in an appeal from Scotland, that the owner of the dog was not liable for the loss, there being no evidence necessarily showing either knowledge of the vicious propensities of the dog or want of due care in keeping him; and it was observed that, both according to the English and the Scotch law, ‘the _culpa_ or negligence of the owner is the foundation on which the right of action against him rests.’”