“Formerly, a custom somewhat similar prevailed in Scotland. Every debtor who obtained the benefit of _cessio_ was appointed to wear ‘the dyvour’s habit,’ which was a coat or upper garment, half yellow and half brown, with a cap of the same colours. In modern times this usage was discontinued. ‘According to the state of public feeling, it would be held a disgrace to the administration of justice. It would shock the innocent; it would render the guilty miserably profligate.’ For a considerable time it had become the practice in the judgment to dispense with the dyvour’s habit, and by the statute of Will. IV. it is utterly abolished.” The work concludes with a very agreeable chapter on the Roman bar, from which we shall borrow a couple of passages. A certain portion of time was generally allowed to advocates for their speeches, but which varied before different judges and at different periods. “A clepsydra was used in the tribunals for measuring time by water, similar in principle to the modern sand-glass. When the judge consented to prolong the period assigned for discussion, he was said to give water—_dare aquam_. ‘As for myself,’ says Pliny, ‘whenever I sit upon the bench (which is much oftener than I appear at the bar), I always give the advocates as much water as they require; for I look upon it as the height of presumption to pretend to guess before a cause is heard what time it will require, and to set limits to an affair before one is acquainted with its extent, especially as the first and most sacred duty of a judge is patience, which, indeed, is itself a very considerable part of justice. But the advocate will say many things that are useless. Granted. Yet is it not better to hear too much than not to hear enough? Besides, how can you know that the things are useless till you have heard them?’ “Marcus Aurelius, we are told, was in the habit of giving a large measure of water to the advocates, and even permitting them to speak as long as they pleased. “By a constitution of Valentinian and Valens, A.D. 368, advocates were authorised to speak as long as they wished, upon condition that they should not abuse this liberty in order to swell the amount of their fees.” The history of Roman practice, and, in particular, of the Cincian Law on the subject of advocates’ fees, is ably condensed; and the law of France and Scotland on the subject is thus stated:—